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Series Preface
We are all experiencing every day that globalization has brought and is bringing
far-flung places and people into ever-closer contact. New kinds of supranational
communities are emerging at an accelerating pace. At the same time, these trends do
not efface the local. Globalization is also associated with a marked reaffirmation of
cities and regions as distinctive forums of human action. All human actions remain
in one way or the other regionally and locally contextualized.
Global environmental change research has produced unambiguous scientific
insights into earth system processes, yet these are only insufficiently translated into
effective policies. In order to improve the science-policy cooperation, we need to
deepen our knowledge of sociocultural contexts, to improve social and cultural
acceptance of scientific knowledge, and to reach culturally differentiated paths to
global sustainability on the basis of encompassing bottom-up action.
The acceleration of globalization is bringing about a new world order. This
involves both the integration of natural-human ecosystems and the emergence of an
integrated global socioeconomic reality. The IYGU acknowledges that societies and
cultures determine the ways we live with and shape our natural environment. The
International Year of Global Understanding addresses the ways we live in an
increasingly globalized world and the transformation of nature from the perspective
of global sustainability-the objective the IYGU wishes to achieve for the sake of
future generations.
Initiated by the International Geographical Union (IGU), the 2016 IYGU was
jointly proclaimed by the three global umbrella organizations of the natural sciences
(ICSU), social sciences (ISSC), and the humanities (CIPSH).
The IYGU is an outreach project with an educational and science orientation
whose bottom-up logic complements that of existing UN programs (particularly the
UN's Post-2015 Development Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals) and
international research programs. It aims to strengthen transdisciplinarity across the
whole field of scientific, political, and everyday activities.
The IYGU focuses on three interfaces seeking to build bridges between the
local and the global, the social and the natural, and the everyday and scientific
dimensions of the twenty-first century challenges. The IYGU initiative aims to raise
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awareness of the global embeddedness of everyday life; that is, awareness of the
inextricable links between local action and global phenomena. The IYGU hopes to
stimulate people to take responsibility for their actions when they consider the
challenges of global social and climate changes by taking sustainability into
account when making decisions.
This Global Understanding Book Series is one of the many ways in which the
IYGU seeks to contribute to tackling these twenty-first century challenges. In line
with its three core elements of research, education, and information, the IYGU
aims to overcome the established divide between the natural, social, and human
sciences. Natural and social scientific knowledge have to be integrated with
non-scientific and non-Western forms of knowledge to develop a global compe-
tence framework. In this context, effective solutions based on bottom-up decisions
and actions need to complement the existing top-down measures.
The publications in this series embody those goals by crossing traditional divides
between different academic disciplines, the academic and non-academic world, and
between local practices and global effects.
Each publication is structured around a set of key everyday activities. This brief
considers issues around the essential activities of Working, Housing and Urbanizing,
as fundamental for survival and will complement the other publications in this series.
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This short book is about cities. Specifically, we are concerned with the overall
process of making cities (in other words urbanizing) and within this broad theme
we focus on the practices of people working in cities and their experiences of
housing in cities. Of course, cities are about much more than jobs and shelter but
these two topics provide the basis for understanding how and why people come to
cities and live there. Making a living and finding or creating shelter are prerequisites
for surviving in the city and they can provide the basis for a fruitful, engaged and
satisfying life as a citizen. They also give us some good starting points for thinking
about the past, present and future of cities.
The study of cities is particularly important for global understanding. First, and
as widely reported in the press, more than half the world’s population now lives in
urban settlements, and this is an ongoing trend likely to reach the level of
three-quarters of the world’s population later in the 21st century. Second, the
influence of cities extends beyond their specific locations to the point where cities
are nowadays increasingly interconnected with one another across the globe.
Moreover, almost all humans living on the planet, both urban and rural, contribute
to the maintenance and growth of cities through provision of food and raw mate-
rials, industrial and service activities, as well as new migrants. These circumstances
have led some commentators to suggest that humanity has become an “urban
species” and to label our times the “first urban century”.
Our century has also been widely termed a “century of crises:” environmental
(notably climate change), political (including wars and refugees), economic
(especially financial crises and deepening poverty), social (with untenable and
rising inequalities), and cultural (including rampant consumerism and growing
social divisiveness). Of course, these multiple predicaments are interrelated and all
are implicated as both causes and effects in this century’s distinctive urban con-
dition. This, then, is a further crucial reason for seeking to understand cities.
Moreover, these crises will be faced by urban residents of the future who will need
all the ingenuity, collective effort and energy from their experiences to drive
humanity in new directions through the 21st century.
© The Author(s) 2016
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There is a fourth and separate reason for studying cities: they are inherently
noteworthy as complex aggregations of social problems and social benefits. On the
one hand, there has been a long history of observers denigrating cities as dense
concentrations of social problems; on the other hand, the broad mass of humanity
clearly is strongly attracted to life in cities, which can also be important sites of
progressive social change. The excitement of cities—traditionally “streets paved
with gold” and today the “bright lights” of the modern metropolis—has also
influenced urban scholars and researchers who have become fascinated by the
varying capacities of people to make satisfactory lives for themselves within the
dense, intricate material and social worlds of cities.
We seek here to capture something of the problems and excitement of cities in
terms of four key cross-cutting themes which help us to get to grips with their
complexity. These are:
• The internal spatial structure of cities. Cities are composed of complex and
multifaceted social phenomena. The distinctively urban character of these
phenomena emerges out of their forms of spatial organization. For example, do
cities enable productive interactions amongst different activities? Is it important
to try to keep some activities, such as houses and factories, apart from one
another?
• The diversity of cities across time and space. One of the important facts about
cities is that they vary greatly depending on history and geography. Ancient
Mohenjo-daro, Classical Rome, Medieval Byzantium, 19th century Manchester,
and 21st century Shanghai can all be described as great cities, but clearly each
differs enormously in empirical detail from the others. What can we learn from
all these different cities about the challenges and opportunities of urban life?
• The external relations of cities. Cities are centres of dense human activities, but
they are also connected to the rest of the world. Cities have always had strong
external relations, which were crucial in their origins and which, in the era of
globalization, have become especially well developed. What is the nature of
these wider connections and why do they matter to cities?
• The internal political conflicts endemic to cities. The dense concentration of
diverse populations and activities in cities means that they are frequently the
sites of internal political contestation. Questions of the “right to the city” and
citizen demands for equitable outcomes constantly confront urban power
structures. Who has the right to shape the future of cities?
We explore these themes in three substantive chapters. The chapter that now
immediately follows (Chap. 2) asks how cities came to be, providing a wide survey
of the history of city formation and focusing on the importance of the external
relations of cities. These processes take on very different aspects at different times
and in different geographical locations so various comparative assessments will also
be explored. In Chap. 3 urban economies are described primarily in terms of their
function as centres of work. The emphasis here is on the many different kinds of
economic activities and employment opportunities that are typically found in cities,
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and how the economic advantages, or agglomeration economies, to be gained by
firms being located close together sustain the growth of cities. Chapter 4 focuses on
housing and places special emphasis on the diversity of cities. Nonetheless, we
identify some common processes and shared issues facing cities across the globe
regarding the challenges of providing and accessing shelter, including the different
roles of states, markets and residents. In a short concluding chapter we ponder what
all this means for urban futures.
In each chapter we present examples from a variety of regions across the world,
and there are also text boxes separate from the main text where we offer com-
mentaries on specific topics. A number of relevant figures and tables are provided,
and we offer some brief bibliographic information that readers can use to deepen
their knowledge of the ideas presented. The book is intended to provide an intro-
duction to urban studies for a wide international audience including students and the
general reader.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, duplica-
tion, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons
license and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the work’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in the credit line; if such material is not included in
the work’s Creative Commons license and the respective action is not permitted by statutory




Cities in Time and Space
2.1 The Uniqueness of Cities
Cities are distinguished from other human settlements by two key features: they
constitute dense and large clusters of people living and working together, and they
are the focus of myriad internal and external flows. This is what makes cities
uniquely active and vibrant places that are always more cosmopolitan than cul-
turally uniform. Historically these features are expressed in different ways over
millennial time as new modes of working and living in cities are generated and
diffused. In this chapter these changes are sketched out from the earliest beginnings
of urbanization to cities in contemporary globalization.
We begin by exploring when and why cities emerged, and how urbanization
today has come to shape life across the entire planet as part of globalization.
Looking at the beginnings of the very earliest cities reveals how the genesis of
urbanization and the external relations of cities are indelibly intertwined. We will
describe how these external relations—links with other cities and with other places
—played a crucial role in the creation of the first cities, and also stimulated wider
processes of change shaping human history, such as the development of agriculture.
The unique dynamism of cities has enabled them gradually and then rapidly to
grow in number and size. Today the flows and networks originating in and circu-
lating through cities are a crucial part of processes of globalization and cities now
play a central role in shaping economies and social life worldwide.
2.2 When Did Cities Begin?
An idea which is essential to any understanding of cities is “civilization.” We can
define this as referring to societies which are spread across relatively large areas of the
globe and which have achieved high levels of social and political interdependence.
© The Author(s) 2016
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Cities and civilizations are indelibly linked: cities are nodes which connect many
different places together, enabling large-scale interdependence. Additionally, they are
the major locales of social change where new forms of working and housing are
continually invented and reinvented to create new dynamic and expansive worlds of
human activity. Thus cities, through their unique connections, sizes and densities,
provide opportunities for people to innovate and adapt their living, always in rela-
tionship with many other places.
Initially seven “pristine” (i.e., independently developed) civilizations were rec-
ognized in Western scholarship, namely, Mesopotamia (in today’s Iraq), Egypt, the
Indus Valley (in today’s Pakistan), China, Central America and the Central Andes
(in today’s Peru). Over time, a strongly western-centric perspective in scholarship
quite wrongly imagined a trajectory of “civilization” and urbanization stretching
over time from Mesopotamia/Egypt through Greece and Rome, culminating in what
was seen as the most important civilization, that of modern Europe and America.
Perhaps this stemmed from the way in which Europeans at this time saw themselves
as uniquely “civilized” compared to other societies. But this intellectual interpre-
tation of the trajectory of cities in time (limited to the last 5000 years) and space
(focused on the West) has become increasingly contested as our understanding of
early urbanization has progressed through modern scholarship. Instead, we find that
many more civilizations existed much earlier in historical time, organized through
interconnected cities; and that by far the most significant and long lasting groupings
of cities in history were those centred on China.
Initially the identification of early cities and civilizations was based upon
excavation of places with large-scale urban monumental remains, notably in
Mesopotamia and Egypt. It was the grand urban architectures of the old civiliza-
tions that had particularly impressed scholars, but it is becoming increasingly
apparent that they had multiple forebears—earlier urban places that developed as
regional groups of cities in many different parts of the world. These cities emerged
from nodes in successful trading networks where existing traders’ camps took on
work in secondary production—converting previously traded raw materials (e.g.
silicon rock) into manufactured goods (e.g. silicon blades)—and in the tertiary
activities this generated (e.g. logistic services such as organization and storage).
Where these new arrangements generated increased demand, transitory trading
camps grew into concentrations of specifically urban activities that we can identify
as the earliest cities.
Although small—the most studied such settlement, Çatalhörük (in modern
Turkey) dating from around 9000 years ago, had a population of about 50001—
these urban places represented an epochal change in communications, opportunities
1In this discussion cities are largely represented by their population sizes. This is a pragmatic
decision: population estimates represent the only data available to compare cities across multiple
regions over several millennia. Of course, all the intricacies of cities—their economic, cultural and
social relations—are left out by this approach but nevertheless simple population totals do provide
some indication of the logistical issues that arise with large concentrations of people. Every day
they have to be fed; fuel for cooking must be obtained; and they need raw materials for working.
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and innovation. Compared to previous hunter-gatherer bands of about 150 people,
new concentrations of people of this size generated many more social interactions,
both within the settlement and through external links. By means of materials pro-
cessing and trading, such people working in and through interconnected regional
groups of small cities created new economic systems.
Such very early cities have been difficult in practice to find. Not only were they
without monumental architecture, their buildings, especially ordinary housing,
would most probably have been made of materials such as mud and wattle, and
these have not survived, especially in wetter regions. Finding urban remains in
these circumstances is largely a matter of serendipity: a classic case is Japan’s
Sannai-Maruyama settlement (Jomon culture) dating back 5500 years with more
than a thousand buildings; it was only found during the digging of foundations for a
new baseball stadium (see Box 2.1). However, archaeologists using new airborne
laser scanning technology are finding new networks of ancient cities in places such
as Amazonia and Cambodia as well as uncovering extensions of known networks in
places such as Egypt.
Box 2.1 Making early cities
Cities were not invented as a complete urban package. The small city that
features most in the debates on early urbanization, Çatalhörük (in Anatolia,
Turkey, some 9000 years ago), illustrates this well: it had no streets! In this
settlement, houses abutted each other and ladders were essential to movement
between houses within the city. Ladders enabled entrance to houses through
holes in their roofs for people travelling across the urban space created by the
combined roofs. The invention of streets to replace ladders as more conve-
nient means of urban movement was to come later.
That there was no simple blueprint for inventing cities is shown in African
indigenous urbanization in the Middle Niger region (West Africa possibly
more than 3000 years ago). Here the layout was the opposite of Çatalhörük; it
was an urban complex with large open expanses up to 200 m wide between a
central cluster of buildings and surrounding smaller clusters. Its similarity to
Çatalhörük is in its concentrating people in new original formats thereby
enhancing inter-personal communication and opportunities for innovation.
Initially, the Middle Niger settlement complexes were not considered to be
“urban” not only because of their unusual structure but also because the
indigenous peoplewere assumednot to be capable of something as sophisticated
as city-building. Such sentiments were to be found with other early city sites:
Great Zimbabwe and associated settlements in southern Africa (c. AD 1300),
earlyMayan cities (in Central America c. 300 BC), and Cahokia (Mississippian
(Footnote 1 continued)
These inputs will be complemented by diverse outputs including waste and products for export.
Size of population, then, can be taken as a rough indicator of flows in and out of a city.
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culture c. AD 1100) were all examples of urbanization denied because local
non-European peoples were not considered feasible city-makers by Europeans
although all are now studied as candidates for early urban process.
Today, searches for early signs of urbanization are among the most
exciting research developments in urban studies. In particular, evidence is
mounting, including from remote sensing, that the dense tropical forests
Europeans encountered in their exploration of the world may not be pristine
nature as originally and continually thought. In particular, the Amazon forest
may have housed a large urban civilization, including a city “fourteen miles
long” on the banks of the Amazon river, and similar claims are being made
for the forests of Congo and South East Asia.
2.3 The Emergence of Large Cities
The multiple beginnings of early cities in regional groups around the world
included what we today would consider to be quite small cities with population
estimates of only a few thousand; much larger cities are found later in traditionally
recognized civilizations (see Box 2.2). And size does matter: the larger the city, the
more social interactions and therefore the greater the chances for generating
innovations. Thus, although Mesopotamia’s cities are no longer seen as being the
first cities, they do constitute the first network that incorporates large cities. For
instance, about 5000 years ago Uruk in Sumer (lower Mesopotamia) had a popu-
lation estimated at 80,000. This counts as a truly new world of working and
housing; think again of the logistics involved. Just the daily feeding and disposing
of the waste of this number of people was a massive undertaking. It is when cities
reach this size that evidence about their form and functions (including their inno-
vations) becomes increasingly available. In Uruk’s case these include the crucial
twin inventions of accounting and writing; the new profession of scribes is an
archetypal urban occupation group.
Box 2.2 Making the first large cities
Early cities relied upon creating a hinterland where the development of
agriculture satisfied the increased demand for food. But these first cities
proved not to be resilient: their rudimentary agriculture put heavy demands on
the soil. To keep up with a growing urban population, agricultural production
gradually moved further and further from the city. At some point transport of
food to the city became too difficult to maintain. Thus early cities appear to
last several generations but are then abandoned leaving their erstwhile hin-
terland as waste land, sometimes referred to as an ‘empty quarter’ reflecting
its desolation.
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To create large cities required a new way of providing food: sustainable
agriculture to enable resilient cities. The solution was irrigation agriculture
based upon controlling flooding that continually replenished the soil. Thus
the first large cities are associated with the great traditional civilizations are
on the lower reaches of major river systems—the Tigris-Euphrates in
Mesopotamia (Iraq), the Nile in Egypt, the Indus in Pakistan and the Yellow
(Hang Ho) and Yangtze rivers in China. Of course these river systems also
facilitated trade—water transport was much more efficient than land transport
before modern industrialization. Hence there was a coming together of two
requirements for a massive new phase or urbanization: trade generating
economic spurts and sustainable productive agriculture.
Subsequently these civilizations became dominated by new imperial
political structures wherein the largest cities were capital cities, politically
favoured by tribute rather than economically favoured by trade. Economic
generation of the largest cities only returned with the onset of modernity after
1500.
Although Uruk is the largest city in early Mesopotamia it should be seen as part
of a Sumerian network of cities, specifically eleven cities with a total population of
over a quarter of a million. It is such great extensions of urbanization that created
what were considered the initial civilizations. Similar spurts of large city growth
occurred in Egypt, China and India perhaps slightly later, and later still in the
Americas and sub-Saharan Africa. In this way cities became an established part of
human history exhibiting continuity to the present. Two urban trajectories were of
special importance, namely, a “West” trajectory combining Mesopotamia and
Egypt (and covering western Asia, Mediterranean/Europe), and an “East” trajectory
centred on China (also including Korea and Japan). Between them these two
regions constituted the nine biggest city networks before 1800 (i.e. prior to modern
industrialization). Each of these networks had ten or more cities with populations
over 80,000 within a two hundred-year period (Table 2.1). Here we find a very
clear challenge to the traditional West-centric narrative concerning the history of
urbanization, for it is the dominance of Chinese networks of cities that stands out.
Note that five (the majority) of these very large city networks are found in the East
compared to the West. More importantly, the East trajectory shows a growth in size
and numbers of cities over time in a single, broad regional grouping whereas there
was no such coherence in the historical urbanizations of the West. Put simply, it is
only in East Asia that we find an historical development encompassing a strong and
continuous urban pattern.
Why, then, is there such a strong traditional emphasis on the role of the West in
the study of large-scale historical urbanization? We would argue that this is the
result of the modern West as the dominant region of the modern era bringing its
own forebears to the front in writing world histories. Correcting this basic geo-
graphical misunderstanding is crucial for two reasons. Historically, we would
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expect the Chinese as inhabitants of the region of great cities to be the most
innovative (see Box 2.3). From a contemporary standpoint, global understanding of
China’s long urban tradition is necessary for placing China’s great current urban
revival in a broader perspective.
Box 2.3 Innovations from the cities of China before 1800
As the centre of the world region with a continuous trajectory of city net-
works over millennia, it is to be expected that China should be the locale for
urban innovations par excellence. And this is indeed the case. Joseph
Needham, the great scholar of China in the mid-20th century, catalogued 262
“inventions and discoveries” and some of the more important that were
converted into practical innovations are listed below:
Abacus; Acupuncture; Anemometer; Axial rudder; Ball bearings; Belt
drive; Blast furnace; Callipers; Cartographic grids; Cast iron; Chain drive;
Chess; Crossbow; Decimal place; Dominoes; Drawloom; Firecrackers;
Flamethrower; Folding chairs; Gear wheels; Gunpowder; Harness;
Hodometer; Hygrometer; Iron-chain suspension bridge; Kite; Lacquer;
Magnetic compass; Mouth organs; Multiple spindle frame; Oil lamps; Paper;
Planispheres; Playing cards; Porcelain; Pound-lock canal gates; Printing;
Relief maps; Rotary fan; Spindle wheel; Steel production; Stirrup; Stringed
instruments; Toothbrush; Trip hammers; Weather vane; Wheelbarrow;
Winnowing machine; Zoetrope.
Table 2.1 The largest historical city networksa
Large city networks Number of large cities Total population contained
in large citiesb
East Asian networks:
Sino-centric: 400–300 BC 14 2,430,000
Sino-centric: AD 700–800 12 2,584,000
Sino-centric: AD 1300–1400 14 2,593,000
Sino-centric: AD 1500–1600 15 2,935,000
Sino-centric: AD 1700–1800 21 5,648,000
Networks in the “West”:
Roman: 200–100 BC 10 2,025,000
Roman: AD 200–300 15 5,963,000
Islamic: AD 900–1000 16 9,320,000
Early modern: AD 1500–1600 13 1,722,000
Worldwide network:
AD 1900 357 106,446,000
aLarge cities are defined as cities with populations of 80,000 and above; civilizations including 10
or more of such cities within a period of two centuries are identified
bNote that these numbers do not represent the total urbanized population in these world regions
because the many more cities with populations below 80,000 are not included
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This is a very impressive list and raises the question as to why China was
not the region to create a global urbanization. In fact China never came close
to such an outcome, remaining a traditional empire until incorporated into the
western economic sphere in the 19th century. As a traditional empire, tribute
from a large and productive peasantry was the main source of wealth for a
political elite so that, despite the large sizes of traditional Chinese cities they
remained demographically a minority.
But focusing on these two major urban developmental trajectories neglects other
parts of the world that did not have so many large cities but nevertheless did create
some very large urban centres of their own. Historical demographers identify 63
very large cities (i.e. cities with over 150,000 inhabitants) before 1800. Of these, 17
reached the impressive size of half a million inhabitants—they are large cities even
by present day standards. All these cities are mapped and named in Fig. 2.1 where
the continuity of cities, their resilience, is also shown in their durability over time—
cities marked by the darkest circles are those which have been more consistently
present over time. Again, it should be remembered that the cities that are mapped
represent only the largest cities in the urban groupings with many more cities below
the size threshold, including many important but smaller urban settlements in
regions not included in the map (notably in the Americas). Many of the cities
named on Fig. 2.1 are well-known (e.g. Constantinople, today’s Istanbul) but there
is a large number that do not have wide recognition today. For instance, about five
hundred years ago, Vijayanagara2 in today’s India was larger than Constantinople
and was probably the second largest city in the world at that time. Therefore the key
point of the map is to show the sheer extent of large-scale urbanization before
modern industrialization.
But let us now draw your attention to the bottom section of Table 2.1. The story
told through large city populations now veers in a new direction. There is a pro-
found transformation in the urban process in terms of both urban scale and geog-
raphy after 1800 that signals a broader societal change. This is the modernity
invented in the West based upon capitalism where economic factors dominate to the
benefit of cities. Thus the growth of very large cities in Europe and the Americas in
the 19th century is not the outcome of a long historical “Western” trajectory of
urbanization as traditionally argued; rather it represents a disruption, a new modern
trajectory that leads to contemporary globalization.
By the end of the 19th century all networks of cities were incorporated into a
single world system. In this new modern world the number of large cities and their
total populations are at a completely different level compared to previous large city
networks. And it is the West (now including the USA) that is conspicuously the
terrain of the new large cities. This change represents the key urban growth phase of
the process that has culminated in the 21st century’s status as the first “urban
2Near contemporary Hampi in Karnataka State, South India. Today it is a world heritage site.






























12 2 Cities in Time and Space
century.” What caused this shift? The answer lies in the significant changes that
took place in the relationships between cities and their wider environments, espe-
cially the political structures of states and empires.
Before the modern era, the world’s population was overwhelmingly rural; even
in the most urbanized regions, city populations largely remained below 10 % of the
total. In this rural world, the largest cities were the capital cities of world empires.
The dominant activities in these cities revolved around political control and
administration together with servicing the needs of the political elites. Tribute
brought from across the empire supported large urban populations. In these tradi-
tional empires there was also an urban hierarchy consisting of inter-related cities,
provincial political centres and economic centres of trade and production.
In China, self-ascribed as the “Middle Kingdom”, the capital city at the centre of
urban networks changed with the dynasties but the rest of the urban system was
stable over time. In the West, the great capital cities of early Empires, i.e. Rome and
Baghdad, persisted over time and were huge centres of consumption, but they were
far apart in time and space. Neither of these cities was to be part of the early modern
city network of the West, which gradually emerged after 1500 (Table 2.1). In fact,
the most dynamic areas of this early modern network were in northwest Europe,
centred on Amsterdam, so it was towards the edge of the traditional urban networks
of the “civilized” world of the West that this important new urban network emerged
(see Fig. 2.1). As a new trajectory, it had a much smaller overall population relative
to the other established historical networks (Table 2.1), making it appear to be an
unlikely starting point for the unprecedented growth that the West experienced
under industrial modernity after 1800.
To understand this radical shift in the scale and geography of modern urban-
ization from the long pre-modern history, we once again find ourselves thinking
about how the course of history has been profoundly shaped by the dynamic nature
of cities, especially their capacity to stimulate innovations and foster external
relations.
2.4 Urban Take off: Modern Cities in Globalizations
The solution to the puzzle as to why the most important modern urban develop-
ments emerged in one of the previously lesser urbanized areas of the globe, is to be
found in the political context of early modern cities rather than in their demography.
Not being part of an overarching empire meant generally that there was no need for
large political centres, which explains the initially smaller size of the cities in the
early modern Europe (Table 2.1). But this also meant that the relative autonomy of
these cities was enhanced. Without an overarching traditional empire, political
authority was divided into multiple territorial states. And, crucially, this fragmen-
tation of political power changed the relations between political and economic
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elites. In traditional empires political elites had dominated the commercial classes;
in the new modern cities, this situation changed into a much more balanced relation
between political and economic forces. New relations between cities and states
came into being, giving more autonomy to cities, and leading to the intensification
of their dynamic role as centres of innovation. With cities as innovation hubs under
reduced political restraint, the outcome has been a speeding up of social change, the
hallmark of modernity. Thus, the regional clusters of centres of economic inno-
vation that have changed our world developed in urban conditions which were
relatively independent of political power. Innovation in these centers has been
above all reflexively related to their underlying economic dynamics. The following
are the three main regional clusters of modern economic innovations.
First, the Dutch cities were the great early modern centres of commercial
innovation in the 17th century and operated in a loose political structure, the
“United Provinces,” that was arguably not a fully formed state, or if so, was a
“merchant’s state” where the political elite exercised only limited power.
Second, in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the great wave of innovations
underlying what we call the Industrial Revolution originated in the towns and cities
of northern Britain, far removed from the political centre of London.
Third, the rise of the USA as an economic power in the late 19th century came as
a consequence of innovations in the cities of the Manufacturing Belt stretching from
New England to the Midwest, within a weak federal state when Washington, DC
was still a small city of minor significance.
These three urban powerhouses of modernity each relied on extensive external
connections, growing through plunder and trade (including the Atlantic trade in
slaves) and through colonial (territorial) and commercial (market) expansions. Their
dynamism accelerated economic development in new uneven geographies then
emerging and leading to the globalized world familiar to us today. As the first of
these economic powerhouses, Dutch cities had a key regional effect on urbaniza-
tion, leading the shift of urban economic growth from Mediterranean Europe to
north Atlantic Europe. This had subsequent global ramifications but was not itself
fully global. However, the other two powerhouses, focused on cities in the UK and
the USA, were the sites of immense urban growth (as indicated by the data for 1900
in Table 2.1). In this new world-making process of urbanization we can identify
three related but distinctive phases of globalization, as a result of worldwide eco-
nomic inter-connections.
2.4.1 Imperial Globalization
This first globalization came to its fruition some time around 1900, though its
influence was still being strongly felt over the first half of the 20th century. The
founder of modern geopolitics Sir Halford Mackinder referred to it as “global
closure.” Imperial globalization derived from the political process whereby the
world was carved up into competing sea empires of European states (and latterly
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involving the USA and Japan). Economically this process operated worldwide—
forming the original or “old international division of labour”—where colonies,
ex-colonies (Latin America), and countries subject to unequal treaties (economic
opening via political pressure, notably in China) supplied food and raw materials
for European markets. This stimulated the emergence of three types of fast-growing
cities: (a) the new imperial capitals in Europe, the largest being London and Paris;
(b) industrial cities in Europe, the largest being Manchester and the Rhine-Ruhr
urban region; and (c) dependent cities beyond Europe dealing with the logistics of
relaying products to Europe and coordinating emerging regional economies, the
largest being Buenos Aires, Shanghai and Calcutta (Kolkata). A parallel regional
structure also developed in North America where New York functioned as the
business and commercial capital complemented by industrial cities in the
Manufacturing Belt (such as Chicago, Cleveland and Pittsburgh) and local supply
cities in the West (Denver, San Francisco), and the South (Atlanta, Dallas).
2.4.2 American Globalization
This form of globalization grew in the first half of the 20th century out of the
regional arrangements just described above. New York became the world’s leading
financial centre. At the same time, a burgeoning mass production system in North
America and Europe was complemented by the development of mass consumption.
Increased productivity translated into higher wages so that levels of consumption
soared in what J.K. Galbraith in the 1950s famously referred to as the “affluent
society.” Across US cities, suburbia became the primary landscape of this new
world of consumption, epitomized by the case of Los Angeles. Americanization is
the term used to describe the diffusion of this way of living beyond the USA. It
encompassed Western Europe over the “long post-war boom” after 1950, and then
spread to middle classes across the world including the former Second World of
communist countries later in the century. The shopping mall came to symbolize
modern cities in the American mode across the world. In addition, an important
political change affected much of the world: the post-1945 era was also a time when
many former colonies became independent countries. In seeking to promote their
own national development paths these countries created new political economies
increasingly centred on their capital cities. Hence, most countries in what came to
be called the “Third World” in the Cold War political climate of the time developed
“primate city” urbanization with one city becoming very much larger than the rest.
The corresponding nationalist agendas in these countries, while fostering new
manufacturing concentrations and civic investment, ironically neglected urban
development beyond the capital. Instead, territorial policies in hinterland areas
displayed a strong commitment to rural development, especially in Africa and Asia.
The extreme case of this kind of policy is represented by China, where urbanization
actually declined in the 1960s.
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2.4.3 Corporate Globalization
The current situation is one that can best be described in terms of corporate
globalization. This represents a progression of Americanization but is increasingly
shaped by other centres of economic influence, notably in Asia. The main agents of
the previous globalization were US multinational firms with highly developed
export capabilities. Then, through the 1970s, the newly emerging communications
and computer industries started to herald a new world of near instantaneous flows of
information worldwide. Corporations were thus increasingly able to operate as
complex global entities, a shift that greatly facilitated the relocation of industrial
production to cities in poorer countries so as to take advantage of cheap labour. This
development was complemented by states pursuing neoliberal, free-market oriented
policies thus opening up national economies to global economic competition and
enabling corporations to invest widely in different countries. These corporations
came to be characterized as transnational, and then, more simply, global corpo-
rations. US firms represent the main instances of these economic goliaths but they
are now joined by firms from many other countries, including China. In the latter
case a rigorous export growth policy initially based upon cheap labour resulted in
the largest rural-urban migration flow in history, more than 100 million people
between 1990 and 2005. The majority of China’s population is now urban. The
outcome of these overall trends has been a highly integrated world economy
undergirding what urban sociologist Manuel Castells has termed a global network
society. Castells identifies global cities and a broader world city network as a spatial
organization challenging traditional international relations of states in the 21st
century.
From Mackinder’s political global closure to today’s world of transnational
corporations, these three globalizations represent a sequence of overlapping pro-
cesses with the earlier phases not disappearing but fading into the later, so that all
are present in contemporary corporate globalization.
2.5 Global Urbanization Inside Out
Historically, urbanization has been closely associated with economic growth, and
cities have typically been the main motors of this growth. The usual result is that the
richest countries characteristically had the largest cities But this is not always the
case today (Table 2.2; see also Box 2.4). This reversal is clearly shown in
Table 2.3. In the development of imperial globalization in the half-century up to
1900 the fastest growing cities were European and US industrial cities and capital
cities, plus a few key ports located in the rest of the world. In the development of
American globalization in the next half-century this general pattern continued but
with a clear tendency for US cities to eclipse their European counterparts. However
with the advent of corporate globalization in the second half of the 20th century this
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Table 2.2 Today’s largest cities (termed Megacities)
Populationa
2016 Rank City Country 2016 1900 1800
1 Guangzhou China 47,700,000 585,000 800,000
2 Tokyo Japan 39,500,000 1,497,000 685,000
3 Shanghai China 30,900,000 619,000 90,000
4 Jakarta Indonesia 28,100,000 115,000 53,000
5 Delhi India 26,400,000 207,000 140,000
6 Seoul Korea (South) 24,400,000 195,000 194,000
7 Karachi Pakistan 24,300,000 114,000 b
8 Manila Philippines 23,300,000 190,000 77,000
9 Mumbai India 23,200,000 780,000 140,000
10 Mexico City Mexico 22,100,000 368,000 128,000
11 New York USA 22,000,000 4,242,000 63,000
12 São Paulo Brazil 21,800,000 239,000 b
13 Beijing China 21,100,000 1,100,000 1,100,000
14 Osaka Japan 17,800,000 970,000 383,000
15 Dhaka Bangladesh 17,600,000 90,000 106,000
15 Los Angeles USA 17,600,000 107,000 b
17 Lagos Nigeria 17,100,000 38,000 b
18 Bangkok Thailand 16,900,000 267,000 45,000
18 Moscow Russia 16,900,000 1,120,000 248,000
20 Cairo Egypt 16,800,000 595,000 186,000
21 Kolkata India 16,000,000 1,085,000 162,000
22 Buenos Aires Argentina 15,800,000 806,000 34,000
23 London Great Britain 14,400,000 6.480,000 861,000
24 Istanbul Turkey 14,300,000 900,000 570,000
25 Tehran Iran 13,700,000 150,000 30,000
26 Johannesburg South Africa 13,400,000 173,000 b
27 Rio de Janeiro Brazil 12,700,000 744,000 29,000
28 Tientsin China 11,400,000 700,000 130,000
29 Paris France 11,200,000 3,330,000 547,000
30 Kinshasa Congo (Dem. Rep.) 10,600,000 b b
31 Bangalore India 10,500,000 161,000 50,000
32 Nagoya Japan 10,400,000 260,000 92,000
33 Lahore Pakistan 10,200,000 200,000 30,500
34 Chennai India 10,000,000 505,000 110,000
35 Xiamen China 10,000,000 100,000 65,000
aNote that estimates of megacity populations vary widely because of the difficulty of defining how
far large city regions extend, often involving combining cities in multi-nodal urban complexes.
Here we use “major agglomerations” from www.citypopulation.de
bPopulation below the bottom threshold of the data (20,000 in 1800; 30,000 in 1900)
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pattern has been completely reversed. The fastest growing cities in this period are
not found in the regions of economic dominance. Rather, of the 25 cities in this
period listed in Table 2.3, seven are from South Asia, five from Latin America, four
from the Middle East, and three each from East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Only
three of these cities are located in the USA, and two of these, Miami and Dallas, are
ranked at the bottom of the list in 23rd and 25th places, respectively.
Box 2.4 Megacities
The United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) is con-
cerned with urban problems—shelter, waste disposal, traffic, air pollution,
water supply—emanating from growth of very large cities. This organization
uses the term “megacity” to describe the largest cities in the world; originally
focusing on cities with populations above 8 million, now the threshold is
10 million. Table 2.2 shows the 35 cities that qualify in 2016. The population
estimates are for “urban agglomerations,” broadly densely integrated city
regions, rather than “metropolitan areas” based upon administrative units.
The former are favoured because they represent the actual urban geography of
the cities rather than their political designation. The table shows cities of
amazing sizes: five over 25 million with Guangzhou approaching 50 million.
For most of these cities the rise to “mega” status has been relatively recent
(Table 2.3). Thus, compared with the eight cities from the richer countries of
the world economy (Europe, USA, Japan), the other 27 cities are critically
struggling to cope with the challenges of their recent rapid expansion in size
with far fewer material resources. China is a special case: the five cities
featured in the table are the tip of an iceberg reflecting the largest rural-urban
migration ever recorded. Although residents of these poorer megacities face
many problems, we should not underemphasize the opportunities that are also
offered. These huge agglomerations of people are a maelstrom of ideas,
inventions and innovations for survival, adaptation, advancement, coopera-
tion and much else in all realms of human activity, not least in creating jobs
and shelter. Whether these social interactions are largely organized through
formal or informal arrangements, legal or illegal in relation to government
regulations, it is in megacities and other very large cities that people will be
forging an urban future in the 21st century.
The current situation, then, is one characterized preeminently by a world-wide
network of major urban centres. Some have been termed, “megacities,” by reason of
their large populations typically in the multiple millions (see Box 2.4). More
generally, “world cities” (also called “global cities”) can be identified by their
functions in integrating the world economy—their deep insertion into global cap-
italism and their significant role in shaping global economic and social processes.
Although many of the most prominent of these cities are located in the
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economically dominant economies of the Global North, increasingly cities in East
and South Asia and elsewhere are playing a significant role in globalization pro-
cesses. We should also recognize that a plethora of smaller urban centres beyond
the mega- and global/world cities exist across the entire globe; these also play an
important role in global economic and social processes and some of them are
marked by exceptionally rapid recent growth.
The following two chapters now explore how it is that cities both shape and are
shaped by the array of broad processes we have discussed so far, focusing on two of
the most significant elements of life in cities, namely, making a living and finding
shelter. It is only after basic needs in regard to work and home are satisfied that
citizens can fully partake in wider aspects of city life. In the end, this form of life
lies at the core of the future of the planet, socially, economically, politically, and
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culturally, for it is in cities that the most advanced and innovative trends of social
change are concentrated.
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Chapter 3
Working
As we saw in the previous chapter, the history of urbanization all around the world
is long and multifaceted. Thus far we have considered this history without paying
much attention to the internal dynamics of cities. In this chapter, we set out to
describe some of the production and employment features of cities. These features
are not only of critical importance in their own right, but also shape urban patterns
and urban growth trends as a whole. In turn, cities constitute major foundations of
the growth and prosperity of modern economies. The discussion that follows
focuses mainly, but not exclusively, on cities in the modern era.
3.1 Working and Living in the Urban Milieu
In their internal organization, cities appear at first glance to be composed of a
bewildering and incomprehensible mass of heterogeneous objects and activities.
More careful scrutiny, however, reveals that there are some fairly systematic
organizing principles that can help to moderate this complexity and to bring it into
more understandable order. In particular, one way of clarifying at least some of the
puzzling diversity that characterizes the internal organization of the city is to
describe it in terms of three broad structural features comprising (a) production
space (areas where goods and services are created), (b) residential space (the parts
of the city where workers live and carry on much of their social life), and (c) cir-
culation space (where movement through the city occurs, and notably the daily
movement of workers between production space and residential space). The
interweaving of these three spaces delineates the spatial layout (spread) and internal
interactions (flows) of every city, though their specific shape and form vary widely
across the cities of the world. Frequently, these spaces interpenetrate and overlap
with one another in various ways, as, for example, when residential space is also
used for production.
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Of course, the city as a whole is always considerably more substantial than this
simple threefold schema suggests, and we would need to introduce many more
social, cultural, and political attributes in order to get a more complete sense of the
urban in its full complexity and vitality. But this schema is useful for our discussion
both here and in the next chapter because it points to some of the most basic
structural elements of the city. Thus, production space is where employment sites
are concentrated and where people earn a living; residential space is where urban
dwellers live, socialize, pursue family life, and raise children; and circulation space
provides channels of access between different urban activities, most especially
between home and work. One of the most obvious features of the modern city is the
daily cycle of urban life in which large numbers of individuals—perhaps the
majority of the adult urban population—leave their residences in the morning and
journey through the city in order to reach their places of employment or livelihood;
and then in the late afternoon and early evening proceed through a reverse set of
motions as they travel from work back to home. This picture is modified in cities
where many people live and seek livelihoods in the same parts of the city, whether
because work is informal or home-based or because accommodation is provided in
factory complexes. It is also worth bearing in mind that “home” involves consid-
erable domestic labour, usually disproportionately borne by women.
In any case, without work, whether formal or informal, and the productive
activities that support it, urbanization as we know it could not survive. Indeed, one
of the primary reasons for the existence of cities in the first place is their function as
centres of economic life. By the same token, production and work activities are the
principal drivers of urban development, and the basic factors that induce the growth
(and decline) of cities.
3.2 From Craft Production to Capitalist Industrialization
Even before the historical transition to industrial capitalism in the 17th and 18th
centuries, the large city populations recorded in the previous chapter were engaged
in distinctive forms of urban life revolving around production and work, and above
all traditional small-scale craft activities focussed on outputs like textiles, ceramics,
furniture, and leather goods, whether for internal consumption or for trade. Some of
this trade involved exchange for agricultural products originating in surrounding
agricultural communities; some of it, usually the greater part, involved exports to
more distant locations in exchange for imports.
With the advent of capitalism and the rise of factory-based types of production,
new modes and patterns of urbanization began to make their historical and geo-
graphical appearance. The most advanced expression of this new order of things is
represented by Britain after the early 18th century when the Industrial Revolution
started its inexorable rise. As in earlier phases, external connections were crucial in
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the development of cities; in particular, Britain’s industrialization was intimately
associated with the import of commodities (i.e. industrial inputs such as cotton and
foodstuffs such as wheat) from various colonies and settler communities around the
world.
The factories and workshops that proliferated as early industrialization processes
in Britain ran their course were located above all in areas close to energy sources
such as waterpower and coalfields. However, as the steam engine came to supplant
the water mill, coal rapidly became by far the dominant source of energy, especially
in the major manufacturing sectors of the 19th century such as textiles, metal goods,
and machinery. Clusters of factories and workshops comprised the functional nuclei
of the rising manufacturing towns. Immediately around them, extensive tracts of
working-class housing also came into being as people (often displaced agricultural
labourers from the surrounding countryside) moved into the towns in search of
employment.
For much of the period of classic industrialization, workers in the main British
manufacturing towns formed a downtrodden and impoverished proletariat, vividly
described by Engels in his book The Condition of the Working Class in England,
which portrays the horrors of working-class housing conditions in Manchester in
the middle of the 19th century. At this time, capitalist forms of industrialization and
urbanization were also developing rapidly in different parts of Continental Europe
and the United States, with resulting urban social problems much like those of
Britain. Early and at first very tentative forms of town planning, such as street
cleaning, public health measures, and housing legislation, were introduced in
attempts to mitigate some of these problems. Also, as the 19th century wore on, the
sporadic passage of relatively progressive social legislation (including the official
authorization of trade unions) gradually, and in noticeably diverse ways in different
countries, brought about improving wages and living standards for the working
classes.
The accelerated economic growth and the associated expansion of towns and
cities in Western Europe and North America over the 19th century meant that these
areas steadily consolidated their already significant position as a dominating core of
the emerging world system, though in practice, the core itself was divided into very
unequally developed regions (in particular, some were focused on agriculture while
others experienced industrial development and accelerated urbanization).
In relation to this core, the rest of the world could be described as a periphery
spread out over Africa, Asia, and Latin America, much of it subject to colonization
and economic dependency in various ways. As a corollary, the organization of
world trade in the 19th century and well into the 20th century adhered to the logic
of an international division of labour in which the periphery produced raw materials
(especially agricultural products and minerals) to supply the factories and feed the
workers of the core countries while a portion of the manufactured products of the
core was exported to the periphery (usually at very unfavorable terms of trade). The
net consequence was greatly enhanced growth in the core and a steadily widening
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gap between the wages and living standards of industrial-urban workers in the core
and the mass of workers in the periphery. In relation to this system, urbanization
under the aegis of colonial capitalism in the periphery was dominated by the
expansion and development of entrepôt (i.e. warehousing and exporting) cities at
coastal sites like Accra, Calcutta (Kolkata), and Lima, which also hosted emergent
production and servicing functions. Urbanization also proceeded at resource
exploitation locations, trading posts, and administrative centres at more inland
locations. Intertwined with the expanding colonial system of urbanization were
networks of earlier indigenous cities and settlements. In these ways the first or
imperial globalization was constituted as a system of uneven and hierarchical
relationships between different places across the world.
3.3 The Mass-Production Metropolis and Beyond
By the beginning of the 20th century, industrialization in the core capitalist
countries was moving into a new and dynamic phase marked by the rise of mass
production and its deployment in process industries like steel and chemicals and
assembly industries such as cars and machinery. In the context of the new rounds of
economic growth set in motion by these events, urbanization in the core capitalist
countries expanded at a notably rapid pace. The most dramatic expression of this
turn of events was the emergence of the so-called Manufacturing Belt of North
America, stretching from the Midwest of the United States to New England plus
adjacent parts of Canada (Fig. 3.1). An echo of this development also occurred in
Fig. 3.1 American Manufacturing Belt. Source A. Pred, The concentration of high value-added
manufacturing. Economic Geography, 1965, 41: 108–132
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the guise of a smaller and more fragmented Western European counterpart
extending discontinuously from the Central Valley of Scotland and the Midlands of
England, through northeastern France, much of Belgium and southern Holland to
the Ruhr region of Germany. Both of these macro-regions constituted the economic
engines of North America and Western Europe over the first half of the 20th century
and well into the 1960s. As such, they constituted by far the most important centres
of industrial production and working-class life in the more economically developed
parts of the world.
Among the principal metropolitan areas in the North American Manufacturing
Belt were Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, Toronto, Montreal, Pittsburgh, and Boston.
Representative cities of the equivalent Western European Belt were Birmingham,
Lille, Roubaix, Essen, and Dortmund. The urban areas of these two great industrial
macro-regions came to be marked over much of the 20th century by distinctive
social and occupational structures reflecting the division of labour in metropolitan
manufacturing systems. On the one side, white-collar workers formed an elite group
of managers, professionals, and technical employees who oversaw production and
commercial affairs. On the other side, large cohorts of blue-collar workers made up
the manual labour force in the primary mass-production plants and their associated
input suppliers. The main industrial cities of North America and Western Europe
also attracted significant inflows of migrants. Thus, over the middle decades of the
20th century, African-Americans moved northwards from Southern states like
Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi into the American Manufacturing Belt in search
of work; and Eastern and Southern Europeans also migrated in large numbers into
major industrial centres not only in Europe but also in North America.
In the 1950s and after, manufacturing activities also started to grow rapidly in a
number of cities in selected parts of the world periphery (e.g. Brazil, Chile, Nigeria,
India, Malaysia, South Korea, and Indonesia). Much of this growth was based on
local import-substitution policies involving the expansion of industrial capacity
designed to displace mass-produced goods imported from the core countries.
Various cities in Asia, (e.g. Kuala Lumpur and Taipei), Africa, (e.g. Lagos and
Accra) and Latin America, (e.g. São Paulo and Mexico City) that were affected by
this trend also acquired significant working class populations whose numbers were
boosted significantly by rural-urban migrants. In some of these places, industrial
workers along with mine-workers and other urban dwellers played an important
role in anti-colonial politics.
The mass-production system revolved centrally around the assembly-line in
large dominant plants constituting the functional core of the system. The suppliers
of these plants formed tiers of direct and indirect input producers. The system was
also associated with many different kinds of administrative, commercial and
financial functions. Some of these functions were located inside the factories in the
main manufacturing cities themselves, but large numbers were also accommodated
in specialized office districts in primate cities like New York, London, Paris, and
Berlin, or in regional centres such as Johannesburg, Hong Kong and Buenos Aires.
In addition, activities like the stock market and merchant banking were concen-
trated in the same cities, as they had been since the time of imperial globalization
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when they played a strong role in the coordination of financial and commodity
flows through international networks. These primate cities were accordingly centres
where the more prosperous business and professional classes congregated, and this
state of affairs was in part reflected in the superior cultural infrastructures and
services that these places had to offer. Even so, certain inner-city areas of these
primate centers were typically occupied by small-scale labour-intensive workshops
producing outputs like clothing, furniture, jewellery, printing services, while sig-
nificant tracts of their more suburban fringes were colonized by large factories.
Over the first half of the 20th century, despite interludes of financial crisis and
war, this industrial-urban system consistently engendered rising wages and high
levels of prosperity in the core countries. In particular, after the Second World War,
the so-called “Long Post-War Boom” lasting until the late 1960s, created unprece-
dented levels of economic well-being for workers in North America and Western
Europe, and helped to underpin the Pax Americana under which the post-War
international political settlement was partly stabilized. These developments coincide
with the period that we earlier described as “American globalization”.
By the 1950s, many parts of the world periphery (now coming to be known as
the “Third World”) were assertively gaining their independence from the former
colonial powers, and were seeking their own pathways to growth and development.
As we have seen, some of the larger Third World countries also attempted at this
time to promote indigenous industrialization programs on the basis of import
substitution. Many cities in these countries experienced waves of in-migration from
surrounding agricultural areas where standards of living were significantly lower
and where technical and organizational changes in agriculture were also leading to
population displacement. Hence population growth in these cities was at times far in
excess of actual labour demands giving rise to shanty towns with large numbers of
economically and politically marginalized individuals making a living on the basis
of informal work (i.e. work that is officially unrecorded and/or evades regulation
and taxation, or is illegal). The urban areas most affected by this syndrome, (i.e.
mega-cities such as São Paulo, Lagos, Mumbai, and Manila) often came to be
described as being “macrocephalic,” signifying their relatively overgrown dimen-
sions in relation to other cities in the same country, and even by comparison with
large cities in richer countries.
3.4 Crisis and Renewal
3.4.1 Industrial-Urban Restructuring
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Long Post-War Boom in the core capitalist
countries was beginning to show signs of exhaustion. The causes of this change are
too complex for a full treatment here, but one of the important contributory factors
was certainly a rapidly accelerating tendency for manufacturing activity to disperse
away from traditional industrial cities and regions and to seek out alternative
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locations where land and especially labour were relatively cheap. This process took
the form of the relocation of branch plants, first of all to the southern states of the
US (the “Sunbelt”) and less developed regions of Europe (like the Italian
Mezzogiorno) and then to various parts of the periphery of the global economy. The
resultant decline of productive activity in the previously dominant industrial cities
of North America and Western Europe provoked deepening fiscal crises and rising
unemployment, so much so that by the mid-1970s, the American Manufacturing
Belt itself was coming to be known as the “Rust Belt,” a term that captures the
extensive dereliction, abandonment, and job loss that came to characterize the
region at this time. Detroit, the former world capital of car production, was notably
devastated by decentralization of production capacity and employment. Even today
much of Detroit remains in a state of advanced decay and its current population is
just half of what it was at the beginning of the 1970s (see Fig. 3.2).
Other major urban casualties of this phase of global urbanization were in some
of the poorest countries in the world, which were especially badly affected by the
economic crises in the US and Europe in the 1970s. Encouraged to take on initially
cheap loans (available as a result of an expanding supply of petro-dollars) to cover
the costs of import-substitution policies and declining income from exports of
primary commodities, the burden of these loans increased greatly as interest rates
rose during the crisis. Cities in countries which had seen significant modernization,
such as Zambia or Kenya, saw a collapse in investment, infrastructure provision and
Fig. 3.2 Empty Packard plant and surrounding derelict land, Detroit, 2010. Source A.J. Scott and
E. Wyly, Emerging cities of the third wave. City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory,
Policy, Action, 2011, 15: 289–321
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even basic services. City life and work became more precarious and informalized—
at times even accompanied by reversal of migration as well as by remittances of
food and income from the countryside to the city.
From the early 1970s onwards, the outflow of branch plants and investment
capital from the core countries of capitalism to selected sites in the world periphery
continued apace. Favored destinations for this relocation activity were export
processing zones in Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Mexico and
Brazil, and subsequently in emerging Chinese industrial cities, such as Shenzhen
and Shanghai. In tandem with these developments the old international division of
labour involving the flow of raw materials to the core and the reverse movement of
manufactured products to the periphery started to give way to a new dispensation in
which unskilled blue-collar manufacturing jobs were increasingly being relocated to
the cities of the periphery while the more skilled white-collar functions of man-
agement, R&D, and commercialization remained concentrated in the large
metropolitan areas of the core countries. Accordingly, it seemed for a while as
though the long-term economic geography of capitalism was destined to coincide
with the establishment of a durable division of global space into two specialized
zones, one devoted more or less exclusively to white-collar employment and the
other to blue-collar employment. It turned out, however, over the 1980s and 1990s,
that much of the world (and especially the urban world of work) was due to develop
in some surprisingly unforeseen ways.
3.4.2 The New Capitalism and Urban Occupational Change
The foundations of the mass-production system and its satellite production activities
coincided preeminently with capital-intensive electro-mechanical technologies. But
after the late 1970s and early 1980s, a new technological regime based on digitized
methods of calculation, information storage, and communication started to emerge
and began insistently to penetrate into all sectors of the capitalist economy,
including not only manufacturing, but also, business, financial, and other service
sectors. As it happens, the 1980s also coincided with the collapse and reorgani-
zation of the old tripartite international order designated in terms of First, Second,
and Third Worlds. This shift was manifest in the rise of corporate globalization as
the concrete expression of a steadily integrating worldwide capitalism reinforced by
a turn to pro-market neoliberalism in the policy sphere.
The new capitalism that started its historical ascent at this time was distin-
guishable not only by a rapidly evolving technological environment, but also by the
displacement of the mass production system as the leading edge of growth and
innovation. Expanding new and revitalized sectors like high-technology and soft-
ware production, business and financial activities, personal services (ranging from
medicine to tourism), and a vast array of cultural and creative industries including
film, music, architectural design, and media rose to prominence as significant foci
of capitalist development. Of special interest here is the fact that these sectors are
28 3 Working
also overwhelmingly located in large metropolitan areas, not only in the traditional
core countries of world capitalism, but now, too, in many big cities in former Third
World countries. Firms in these sectors are strongly susceptible to agglomeration
economies in the sense that as they cluster together so the costs of interfirm
interaction and labour recruitment tend to fall while innovation is stimulated by the
co-presence of many different producers and associated interfirm flows of infor-
mation. Hence firms in these sectors frequently locate in close proximity to one
another in the city to form specialized industrial districts, including high-technology
clusters, office districts, and quarters devoted to creative and cultural production
(see, for example, Fig. 3.3). These sectors and the work arrangements peculiar to
them now account for some of the most dramatic and far-reaching shifts in patterns
of urbanization today, especially but not exclusively in the more advanced capitalist
countries.
As digital technologies and corresponding organizational readjustments pene-
trate into the more advanced sectors of contemporary capitalism, the economic and
social character of the cities where these transformations are most in evidence is
shifting rapidly. This is apparent not only in new and revitalized clusters of
Fig. 3.3 Locations of motion-picture production companies in Los Angeles. Many different kinds
of industries at different periods of capitalist urbanization evince this same tendency to form
specialized industrial districts in the city. Clustering of individual production units is induced in
large degree by their transactional interrelationships and by their joint dependence on a common
labour market. Source A.J. Scott, A new map of Hollywood: the production and distribution of
American motion pictures, Regional Studies, 36, 2002, 957–975
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economic activity within cities but also in new kinds of labour market structures
and corresponding forms of social stratification that are being grafted onto and are
increasingly replacing older social arrangements. In very schematic terms, the upper
occupational tier characteristic of the new capitalism in large cities today can be
identified in terms of what Richard Florida has called a “creative class” or what
others have referred to as “symbolic analysts.” This upper tier is made up chiefly by
highly qualified and usually well-remunerated individuals whose work requires
them to exercise well developed cognitive and cultural skills in activities that
include scientific research, engineering, software development, financial analysis,
business consulting, film production, artistic pursuits, and so on. The lower occu-
pational tier, by contrast, is composed to a large degree of individuals who carry out
tasks like child care, house cleaning, taxi driving, dish-washing, infrastructure
repair, unskilled office work, and a host of similar low-paying activities.
Note the important point that a significant proportion of the occupations in the
lower tier of the labor force consist of activities that involve both direct and indirect
services to the upper tier of urban workers. Also, in response to the elevated
flexibility of labour demand arrangements in the new capitalism, the organization of
work in both the upper and lower tiers (but especially in the lower) is frequently
typified by high levels of part-time and temporary employment. The resultant
precariousness of employment for many low-paid workers in the cities of advanced
countries, and the stark contrasts between skilled, well-paid work, and unskilled
poorly paid work resembles in some respects the more strongly informalized and
unequal labour markets of cities in middle and lower income countries.
An exemplary case of how work in many large cities is changing in response to
these developments can be found in the shifting occupational structure of the Los
Angeles metropolitan area over the last decade or so. Thus, between 2000 and
2012, the number of blue-collar workers in manufacturing in Los Angeles declined
by as much as 31.8 %. Over the same period, the number of workers in high-level
or cognitive-cultural occupations grew by 39.0 % while workers in low-wage
service occupations increased by 18.6 %. A large proportion of the latter workers is
comprised of ethnic and racial minorities and immigrants from low-wage countries.
A further symptom of the changing structure of rewards and penalties in urban life
today is the great expansion in the number of homeless individuals in large cities. It
is estimated, for example, that some 30,000 homeless individuals are now living in
and around the downtown area of Los Angeles.
Urban economies across many cities in Africa and Asia, too, are marked by high
levels of “informality,” involving small-scale production, repair and recycling,
marketing of agricultural goods, and retail trade. In India, for example, estimates
placed informal employment at 83 % of non-agricultural employment in 2000, and
in Kenya at 72 %. Across much of Africa informal employment stands at over
80 % of the working-age population in cities. Some of this informal activity is
caught up in long distance trading networks, as for example in the case of consumer
goods transported from Southeastern China to West Africa. Global corporate
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producers, too, are frequently connected to the informal economy as in the case of
production activities that are linked to poorly regulated factories and sweatshops. In
addition, formal workers in many cities rely on informal supplies of housing and
services.
3.5 Urbanization and Work in the 21st Century
In the 19th and much of the 20th centuries we could speak reasonably meaningfully
about a world system comprising a core and periphery each with distinctive patterns
of economic development and urbanization. Echoes of this core-periphery termi-
nology continue to resonate in what scholars in the 21st century often refer to as the
Global North and the Global South, indicating respectively the wealthier and poorer
areas of the globe, and the often stark inequalities existing across different parts of
the world. As globalization proceeds, however, the mutual interpenetration of the
North and the South becomes increasingly pronounced. Unskilled immigrants from
the Global South converge persistently and in substantial numbers on the cities of
the Global North where they for the most part find jobs entailing low-wage menial
activities. Conversely, direct foreign investment in “emerging economies” remains
high despite a slowdown of economic growth in these countries in recent years. At
the same time, while the most advanced sectors of capitalism today are concentrated
in the cities of the North, many are also firmly implanted in the cities of the South,
which by the same token are also playing an increasingly important role in
exporting high-technology, business service, cultural, and allied products to the
North.
Systematic evidence of this changing economic geography can be found by
scrutinizing Table 3.1, which lists 75 cities identified by MasterCard as the most
attractive worldwide centres for advanced business and commercial activity in
2008. This particular ranking has its deficiencies, but it is probably about as good a
representation of a first-cut urban-economic geography of the more prosperous side
of the new capitalism as we are likely to get at the present time. Not surprisingly,
Table 3.1 reveals that the cities of the Global North are clearly dominant, with
London, New York, and Tokyo occupying first, second, and third places, respec-
tively. However, a number of cities from the former Third World also rank highly,
notably Singapore, Hong Kong, Seoul, Taipei, and Shanghai, all of them in Asia. In
addition, as we scan further through the rankings a large number of cities from other
parts of the erstwhile Third World also increasingly make an appearance, and cities
like these will undoubtedly improve their rankings in the future.
In spite of the eclipse of the mass production system and the rise of new
configurations of business and advanced industrial activity, traditional manufac-
turing has by no means disappeared and is still quite evident in many cities around
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Table 3.1 The top 75 Worldwide Centers of Commerce as defined by Mastercard Worldwide
Rank City Country Index
value




79.17 39 Dusseldorf Germany 50.42
2 New York United States 72.77 40 Geneva Switzerland 50.13
3 Tokyo Japan 66.60 41 Melbourne Australia 49.93
4 Singapore Singapore 66.16 42 Bangkok Thailand 48.23
5 Chicago United States 65.24 43 Edinburgh United
Kingdom
47.79




7 Paris France 63.87 45 Tel Aviv Israel 46.50
8 Frankfurt Germany 62.34 46 Lisbon Portugal 46.46
9 Seoul South Korea 61.83 47 Rome Italy 45.99
10 Amsterdam Netherlands 60.06 48 Mumbai India 45.71
11 Madrid Spain 58.34 49 Prague Czech
Republic
45.50
12 Sydney Australia 58.33 50 Kuala
Lumpur
Malaysia 45.28
13 Toronto Canada 58.16 51 Moscow Russia 44.99
14 Copenhagen Denmark 57.99 52 Budapest Hungary 44.52
15 Zurich Switzerland 56.86 53 Santiago Chile 44.49
16 Stockholm Sweden 56.67 54 Mexico City Mexico 43.33
17 Los Angeles United States 55.73 55 Athens Greece 43.25
18 Philadelphia United States 55.55 56 São Paulo Brazil 42.70
19 Osaka Japan 54.94 57 Beijing China 42.52
20 Milan Italy 54.73 58 Johannesburg South
Africa
42.04
21 Boston United States 54.10 59 Warsaw Poland 41.26
22 Taipei Taiwan 53.32 60 Shenzhen China 40.04
23 Berlin Germany 53.22 61 New Delhi India 39.22
24 Shanghai China 52.89 62 Bogotà Colombia 38.27
25 Atlanta United States 52.86 63 Buenos Aires Argentina 37.76
26 Vienna Austria 52.52 64 Istanbul Turkey 36.14
27 Munich Germany 52.52 65 Rio de
Janeiro
Brazil 35.91
28 San Francisco United States 52.39 66 Bangalore India 35.78
29 Miami United States 52.33 67 St. Petersburg Russia 35.55
30 Brussels Belgium 52.16 68 Jakarta Indonesia 35.40
31 Dublin Ireland 51.77 69 Riyadh Saudi
Arabia
35.37
32 Montreal Canada 51.60 70 Cairo Egypt 35.29
33 Hamburg Germany 51.53 71 Manila Philippines 35.15




Rank City Country Index
value
Rank City Country Index
value
35 Dallas United States 51.25 73 Chongqing China 33.13
36 Washington DC United States 51.19 74 Beirut Lebanon 31.81
37 Vancouver Canada 51.10 75 Caracas Venezuela 26.11
38 Barcelona Spain 50.90
Names of cities lying in peripheral and formerly peripheral areas of the world system are set bold
Fig. 3.4 Geographic distribution of shoe manufacturers in Marikina City, Philippines. Each dot
represents one manufacturer. Barangays, or local administrative divisions, within Marikina City
are named, as are adjacent municipalities. The inset shows the location of Marikina City within the
Manila Metropolitan Area. Source A.J. Scott, “The Shoe Industry of Marikina City, Philippines: A
Developing Country Cluster in Crisis”, Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies, 20,
2005, 76–99
3.5 Urbanization and Work in the 21st Century 33
the world cities, and nowhere more so than in Asian cities where foreign and
domestic owned factories abound. China exemplifies this point dramatically.
Additionally, industry in the form of small-scale, labour-intensive production can
be found extensively in poorer countries, as exemplified by the information pro-
vided in Fig. 3.4 and Box 3.1 where the shoe industry of Marikina City in the
Philippines is described. At the same time, marginalized informal and precarious
labor continues to proliferate in large cities in poorer countries (Fig. 3.5). The
recent expansion in manufacturing and other economic activity in more dynamic
Asian and other cities represents an important opening towards growth and pros-
perity, but the poorest cities of the global South, notably in Africa, have struggled to
attract outside investment beyond the primary commodity and minerals extraction
sectors. All the same, many African cities, including Dakar, Accra, Lagos, Kigali,
Nairobi, and, of course, Johannesburg, are increasingly participating in the modern
world economy as entrepreneurial centres in their own right, and local economic
development policies in many parts of the continent are seeking to strengthen the
networks and productivity of the informal economy as well.
Box 3.1. The Shoe Industry of Marikina City, Philippines
Marikina City lies in the far northeast of the Manila Metropolitan Area. For
over a century it has functioned as the principal centre of the Filipino shoe
industry. Like much small-scale enterprise in both rich and poor countries, the
industry is organized into a tight spatial cluster of firms (see Fig. 3.4) that
often work together in various kinds of subcontract relations and that share a
common labour market. Most of these firms are quite small and few of them
employ more than ten workers. Wages are notably low in the Marikina shoe
industry, and the main output consists of cheap shoes fabricated in both
leather and synthetic materials for the domestic market. Almost all of the
firms within the industry are family enterprises owned by individuals with
roots that go deep into the local community. A distinctive intra-family divi-
sion of labor is discernible in many shoe factories, where the wife is fre-
quently engaged in financial and commercial tasks and the husband in
shop-floor supervision. Some child labour is also to be found in the industry.
Until the 1980s, the shoe industry in the Philippines was protected by high
tariff barriers, but over the 1990s trade liberalization accelerated greatly. One
effect of this shift has been a notable rise in imports of foreign shoes into the
country with China leading the way as the main source of supply. This state
of affairs has forced many Marikina shoe manufacturers to close down in
recent years. One response to this state of affairs on the part of local manu-
facturers and policy makers has been to attempt to upgrade the quality of
shoes produced so that they can fend off competition from imports and
contest niches in international markets.
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3.6 A Variegated and Uneven Mosaic
One way in which we can begin to make sense of some of the more recent trends
and patterns described in this chapter is to put them in the context of the multi-
dimensional global system of cities outlined in Chap. 1. A world-wide network or
lattice of large cities and extended city-regions has emerged since the end of the
20th century, almost all of them characterized by dynamic economies, with multiple
links and connections to each other as well as to many different small and
medium-sized urban areas, agricultural zones and areas of resource extraction.
The core cities and city-regions that make up this worldwide lattice have pop-
ulations in the multiple millions, and in some cases in the tens of millions (see
Table 2.3), and are found in both the global North and the global South. These
cities are the preeminent sites of the segmented occupational and economic systems
described earlier, though each of them has its own specific character reflecting its
peculiar forms of economic activity. Accordingly, these cities compete and col-
laborate with one another across the globe in relation to their complementarities and
correspondences. Interspersed within this dominant pattern of global city-regions
are large numbers of small and medium-sized cities with an enormous diversity of
economic characteristics.
Fig. 3.5 Repair and recycling of old cooking oil cans, Mumbai, India. Source National
Geographic, http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0705/feature3/gallery7.html. Published with
permission of Magnum Photos
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Certainly, modes and levels of economic development differ greatly from one
another across this global-urban system so that the forms of labour, livelihood and
employment characteristic of each individual city also vary widely. Moreover, work
activities not only differ greatly from one city to another but are also highly var-
iegated both functionally and spatially within each individual city. Much of this
variegation is, of course, an expression of the intra-urban division of labour.
Cities, then, are dense clusters of inter-related processes of production, work,
and life. This inter-relatedness is also one of the principal foundations of what,
following the sociologist Emile Durkheim, we might refer to as the organic soli-
darity of urban society, that is, the tightly-wrought interdependencies that hold
cities together as centres of shared social, economic and public life. Equally,
though, urban communities in capitalism are dense sites of private property,
competitive economic relationships and socially selective forms of appropriation so
that urban existence is also subject to intense contestatory pressures. The following
chapter elaborates on these themes of the private and the public in cities in relation
to the challenge of creating and finding urban shelter.
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Chapter 4
Housing
4.1 The Challenge of Shelter
The expansion of urban economies has been accompanied by constant migration of
people to cities in search of opportunities for work and livelihood, as discussed in
the previous chapter. There are other reasons for living in cities such as seeking
refuge from conflict, or being forced to move there when livelihoods elsewhere are
threatened. Urban dwellers’ children add to the numbers as well, so underlying high
or low natural birth and death rates can set a baseline of rapid urban growth or
generate a tendency for settlements to decline. As a result of all these processes, the
number of people living in urban settlements expands and declines at different rates
in different contexts (see Box 4.1).
Box 4.1 Querying the growth of urban populations
Thus far in this short book we have presented urban populations and the
growth rates as known facts. In fact they are estimates whose veracity varies
greatly by time and space. Severe problems with the poverty of data continue
to the present in many of the poorest countries of the world.
The growth in urban populations, and of the number of people living in
cities compared to other settlements, involves many different factors. In
Africa, for example, urban birth rates generally remain high, adding more
people to cities as they are born there, only slightly less than in rural areas,
but as rural death rates are higher the proportion of population in cities is
generally expanding. Nonetheless, there have been persistent overestimates of
the rate of growth of cities in Africa, not helped by the fact that censuses have
not been regularly conducted. In fact, at times, especially after the widespread
economic crisis of the 1980s across the continent, there has been strong
evidence of relative stagnation and even reversal in urban growth. Often cities
seem to expand rapidly because growing numbers of people settling in nearby
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agricultural areas leads to these places being reclassified as urban. In India, in
the decade to 2015 nearly 30 % of urban growth was a result of the reclas-
sification of existing settlements and not rural to urban migration; and in
China between 1990 and 2005 nearly 120 million people were added to cities
in this way. Why do predictions about urban populations matter? Knowing
where people are living informs decisions about where to invest resources for
services, employment or humanitarian support.
No matter why people move to cities, finding secure shelter and the basic
services to sustain life is often a significant challenge. The World Bank estimates
that up to one billion people across the world live in shelter that is either of poor
quality, lacks basic infrastructural services such as water or sewerage (thus making
for unsafe living conditions) or is insecure in that the residents have no clear rights
to their dwelling places (the controversial term “slum” is often used to describe
these settlements—see Box 4.2). One of the major challenges for cities of the
future, then, concerns not only how they can offer people opportunities to find
decent work and wages, but also how urban populations will be housed.
Box 4.2 A note on the term “slum”
This term usually has derogatory connotations and can suggest that a set-
tlement needs replacement or can legitimate the eviction of its residents.
However, it is a difficult term to avoid for at least three reasons. First, some
networks of neighbourhood organizations choose to identify themselves with
a positive use of the term, partly to neutralize these negative connotations;
one of the most successful is the National Slum Dwellers Federation in India.
Second, the only global estimates for housing deficiencies, collected by the
United Nations, are for what they term “slums”. And third, in some nations,
there are advantages for residents of informal settlements if their settlement is
recognized officially as a “slum”; indeed, the residents may lobby to get their
settlement classified as a “notified slum”. Where the term is used [here], it
refers to settlements characterized by at least some of the following features: a
lack of formal recognition on the part of local government of the settlement
and its residents; the absence of secure tenure for residents; inadequacies in
provision for infrastructure and services; overcrowded and sub-standard
dwellings; and location on land less than suitable for occupation. For a dis-
cussion of more precise ways to classify the range of housing submarkets
through which those with limited incomes buy, rent or build accommodation,
(text from D. Satterthwaite, 2016, “A New Urban Agenda?” Environment and
Urbanization, 28, p. 3).
In the 1990s the goal of improving the quality of urban housing was adopted by
the United Nations, and in the year 2000 their “Millennium Development Goals”
set a target to achieve a significant improvement in the lives of 100 million “slum”
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dwellers by the year 2020. The 2015 UN report on these Development Goals noted
that the overall proportion of the urban population living in “slums” in low and
middle-income countries fell from approximately 39.4 % in 2000 to 29.7 % in
2014. But given the rapid processes of urbanization that persist in many parts of the
world, the absolute numbers of people thought to be living in poor quality housing
in cities actually increased to over 880 million urban residents compared to
792 million reported in 2000 and 689 million in 1990.1 The growing significance
of urban concentrations across the world has seen a renewed focus on improving
the quality of life in cities, with a specific Urban Sustainable Development Goal
(SDG) declared by the UN in September 2015, to “make cities and human settle-
ments inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.”
While every city has its own distinctive story of how housing has been devel-
oped and used, and of how people find their way to settle in different areas of the
city, there has also been a lot of sharing of ideas around the world about how to
meet the challenges of providing housing, especially through networks of cities and
urban professionals, and through international organizations such as the World
Bank and the United Nations. As a result there are often strong similarities in
housing policies and design across different cities.
We can also detect some overarching processes which shape who lives where in
cities. Above all, markets in land and housing help to sort the internal spaces of
cities into different areas by income with affordability being a major limitation on
where it is possible to find accommodation; social divisions like ethnicity, race,
religion or political affiliation can also draw residents into or direct them away from
certain neighbourhoods for safety or sociability reasons; and powerful interests or
violence might leave people with little choice as to where they can find shelter. As it
is such an important part of being able to survive in the city, housing is often the
focus of protests and political demands. Sustaining life in cities rests, to a large
extent, on securing rights to shelter and to the basic services often tied to houses,
like water, energy, and waste removal. These rights to the city have been pressed on
national governments in different countries by popular mobilization, resulting in
state involvement in housing delivery in many cities, and they are also an important
part of international development agendas. Access to housing not only supports
important welfare goals such as improving health and widening access to services,
but housing also provides opportunities for residents, especially women, to generate
an income through informal economic activities or renting out rooms, and so it is
also closely tied to economic development goals.
Nonetheless, the challenges of housing and basic services take on different forms
in different cities. For some cities, there is simply not enough housing to cope with
the growing urban population and many residents construct their own shelters in
often very insecure situations. Where wages are low and livelihoods precarious,
meeting housing needs can present an extreme challenge to households. In some
cities, the intense development pressures due to globalization can make housing
1www.un.org/milleniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report.
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unaffordable, so even if there is a large supply of accommodation many people on
low or modest incomes often struggle to find somewhere to live, and vacant
properties coexist with overcrowding and occupancy of apartments by multiple
families or generations. This is exacerbated in cities that are strongly exposed to
global property markets or to ambitious local redevelopment plans, and in highly
unequal societies. One manifestation of this is “gentrification” involving the dis-
placement of residents from low-income neighbourhoods in selected parts of the
city, and their upgrading by means of vigorous property redevelopment, usually for
the benefit of higher income groups.
To better understand the challenges of housing in cities we will look at a number
of different urban contexts and, as with earlier chapters, we will trace some common
historical trends explaining how cities have come to be the way they are today, and
explore what processes will be shaping cities of the future.
4.2 Providing Housing Through States and Markets
4.2.1 Housing Needs and Housing as a Commodity
Numerous observers have written of the terrible conditions in which many people
live and have lived in cities around the world. We noted above the writings of
Friedrich Engels, an industrialist and collaborator of Karl Marx, who observed the
brutal treatment of new industrial workers both in the workplace and in the
shockingly overcrowded, damp and poorly constructed shelters in early industrial
Manchester, England. As they grew rapidly across the world, cities in modern times
drew philanthropists, housing reformers, city officials and a growing body of
professionalized housing officers and planners as well as residents themselves to
express concern and take various kinds of action against poor quality housing and
its effects on people’s health and the functioning of the city.
One of the perennial challenges has been how to provide adequate housing for
those who live on meagre incomes. This brings to the fore some of the tensions of
market economies, where housing and land are often seen as commodities whose
function is to generate profit for land owners, developers, builders and landlords.
The quality of housing therefore often depends on the nature of the economic
opportunities available to residents, a factor that determines what they can afford.
Housing quality also depends on whether states or other collective institutions play
a role in facilitating access to housing. Historically in Europe, and in most countries
today, renting housing from private landlords of various kinds has been the most
prevalent mode of accessing accommodation, including in informal settlements.
The evident tension between landlords’ search for profit and the affordability of
housing for the tenant, as well as the difficulties of ensuring good quality and
sufficient quantity of housing through the market has led to various initiatives to
shape housing on the part of the state.
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4.2.2 State Interventions
Some of the earliest forms of “social” housing for the poor in Western cities were
rental properties developed as philanthropic investments, where a guaranteed but
low return to the investor was proposed, and where tenants received often quite
intrusive supervision and support in organizing their finances and their lifestyles in
the new homes. Many planned 19th century factory towns such as Saltaire in the
UK and Pullman in the USA also displayed analogous forms of paternalism. But as
housing issues came to the fore in local and national politics through the 20th
century, states themselves became increasingly involved in regulating housing
conditions through laws and standards.
Concerns grew about how to solve the health and social problems associated
with poor housing, and a category of “slum” housing developed during the 19th
century, defined by overcrowding, poverty, and the poor physical state of buildings.
Such areas have often been targeted for demolition, and their populations removed
to new housing—or simply displaced and left to find alternative places to live. More
generally, areas which are home to poorer residents are vulnerable to removal if
they are on land which powerful actors such as states, businesses and wealthy
residents would like to see redeveloped, often leading to gentrification and
displacement.
States also began taking responsibility for implementing ideas about what makes
for a good city, notably how different activities and buildings should be arranged in
the city. Urban planning addresses issues such as which land uses should be located
close to one another, or should be kept apart through zoning rules. Urban spatial
planning can be very helpful in cities, where so many often incompatible activities
jostle for space, but it has also been used to place restrictions on where different
groups can live or to remove people from areas that contravene the “plan.” For
example, housing for the poor can often be effectively excluded from wealthy areas
of the city by zoning limitations on building multi-family properties; or the exis-
tence of formal Masterplans has been used in litigation by middle classes in some
Indian cities, such as Delhi, to enforce the removal of longstanding informal set-
tlements. The development of planning interventions which support and work with
the aspirations of the poor and the solutions which they themselves devise is an
urgent element of finding more effective and inclusive solutions to shelter needs in
cities.
Planning visions of how neighbourhoods and cities should be organized and
designed have influenced city development around the world. One prominent
example of this is the idea of the “Garden City”, initially associated with British
urban planners, Ebenezer Howard and Patrick Geddes. This and allied ideas cir-
culated widely, proposing that “new” cities or suburbs be built with houses
arranged around communal facilities in healthy, greenfield sites with socially mixed
populations and selected restrictions on socially undesirable activities (such as
frequenting bars). Housing following these principles was developed through the
middle decades of the 20th century in many cities around the world—from Tel
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Aviv to Cape Town (see Fig. 4.1). These ideas also partly influenced the layout of
segregated neighbourhoods built for African people in British colonial Africa, and
in other cities such as Kinshasa. The principles of neighbourhood design in suburbs
across the US, and, at a very different scale, the massive housing blocks or
“mikrorayons” (microdistricts) built throughout the Soviet Union, all embody some
principles drawn from the garden city idea, such as limiting the flow of vehicles on
residential streets, and providing enclosed communal spaces within clusters of
housing. These ideas continue to have relevance today, for example, inspiring a
major new satellite city development, Lingang, on the outskirts of Shanghai.
While state involvement in housing provision first emerged in the 19th century,
it was primarily after the Second World War that large-scale state intervention in
housing became prominent. At this time, extensive developments appeared, such as
working-class housing on the outskirts of Paris, council housing estates in the UK,
public housing in a number of US cities, such as New York and Chicago, mass
housing provision across the former Soviet Union and central Europe, and exten-
sive but initially racially segregated provision of housing in many African and
Asian cities (e.g. Johannesburg; Nairobi, Singapore, Mumbai). In these types of
intervention, central state funding was mobilized directly to construct houses, or
was used to subsidize private developers in various ways. The shift from private
rental of accommodation to the state as the major landlord was significant in many
cities. Access to housing was organized through state bureaucracies in both the
West and the Soviet context, leading some commentators to point out a number of
Fig. 4.1 Garden City—White City Tel Aviv (aerial view of dizengoff circus tel aviv, and
surrounding district, 1951). http://gpophotoheb.gov.il/fotoweb
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similarities in urban developments across these politically very different contexts at
this time. In poorer country contexts, however, these kinds of housing develop-
ments were limited in scope, and were seldom able to develop financial models
which allowed housing to reach beyond the middle classes (although apartheid
South Africa was an important exception to this, delivering hundreds of thousands
of homes to those African people permitted to live in cities under the notorious pass
laws from the 1950s to the 1970s).
4.2.3 Private Finance
A separate strand of housing provision has been through private home ownership
largely in suburban or peripheral locations. This is often associated with individual
mortgages and financing through bank loans or more specialist building
societies/home loan banks supporting individual home ownership. The latter
developed in the late 19th century in the UK and USA pooling resources in a
cooperative ‘self-help’ process but they transmuted into more conventional finance
marketing in the 20th century. Where mortgage markets are weakly developed,
individuals pay for housing purchases through individual savings or find other
sources of financing, such as co-operative ventures, families or informal savings
groups.
The growth of housing through private ownership is most characteristically
associated with the expansion of the middle classes and the high wage/mass con-
sumption growth path of the US under Fordism (as identified earlier).
A coincidence of interests between the state, car industry and property developers
led to the consolidation of suburbs as the norm for housing delivery. The result is
often a sprawling multi-nodal city dependent on private cars and with very limited
public transit infrastructure. This model has been important in cities in different
parts of the world, for example in Southeast Asia since the 1980s where extended
suburbanization, gated communities, satellite cities and freeway developments have
led to a blurring of land use patterns in rural-urban fringe areas. These relatively
haphazard and diverse extended peripheral developments constitute one of the
predominant features of the contemporary city.
Where private home-ownership becomes the dominant mode of housing pro-
vision, this can create a significant problem of access to housing for the very
poorest citizens for whom mortgage financing is usually not feasible. This was
perhaps most vividly demonstrated in 2008, when loans had been inadvisedly
extended to high-risk, low-income homeowners in the US, and hidden in complex
secondary financial instruments, thereby helping to instigate a global economic
crisis. In the absence of effective state intervention, other private solutions often
emerge, more commonly associated with private renting. For example, low quality
dense and relatively high-rise apartment blocks or “tenements” are common, with
low-cost and frequently sub-divided apartments occupied by a number of families.
Built (or converted to multi-family or residential use from existing buildings) by
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private individuals with little regulatory oversight, these predominate in some
central city areas in South America as they do in many sprawling residential areas
of African cities today and in “urban villages” in China where villages have been
incorporated into expanding metropolitan regions providing villages with an
opportunity to develop their land to meet burgeoning housing needs. Tenements
were also historically important in 19th and early 20th century European cities.
In the mid-1970s, affordability issues for the lowest income households in poorer
countries were recognized in the promotion by the UN of in situ upgrading and “site
and service” schemes as the solution. Here a combination of self-help, legalized
tenure, subsidies and supported access to mortgage financing provided serviced
sites (with no house, or a very rudimentary structure) which could then be incre-
mentally developed by residents. This made more inroads into addressing housing
need. A number of problems emerged, however, including the capture of benefits
by the middle classes, the high costs of land, and continuing affordability issues for
the very poorest, which undermined the success of this policy initiative. In the end,
where states and markets have failed, urban residents in many cities have occupied
land and built their own shelter, often in very precarious situations.
4.3 Housing Solutions for the Future City
A range of models therefore exist around the world to inform choices about how
states and communities might provide for housing needs in the future.
In contexts like Singapore and Hong Kong governments have played a con-
tinuing strong role in housing provision. In Singapore in 2009, 82 % of the pop-
ulation lived in housing governed and delivered by a public body, the Housing and
Development Board (Fig. 4.2). But the intriguing aspect of this model is that 87 %
of the population own their own homes (up from 9 % in 1960). Both Singapore and
Hong Kong have developed a hybrid model in which individuals own apartments,
but the state continues to own the land and to benefit financially over the long term
from the increases in land value associated with housing, infrastructure and
planning-related developments. Private developers lease land and gain profit from
building and selling the apartment blocks, but the state retains the ability to benefit
from the increased value of the land. They are also able to bid to direct new
developments or oversee the redevelopment of existing properties.
This stands in strong contrast to the model of housing development in Chile, for
example, (and copied in places like Mexico, Turkey and South Africa) where while
states subsidize houses for the very poor, or provide support for low- to
middle-income residents to purchase houses or apartments, they pass on the
opportunity to earn profits from the land, housing and financing to individuals and
private sector developers. Land costs and limited subsidies drive developers to seek
cheap land, usually very inconveniently located in peripheral areas of the city. These
challenges of the costs of land and poor location of housing have also beset the
experience of mass housing delivery in Hong Kong, where large numbers of poor
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residents and migrants placed greater strain on the housing delivery system. This
reminds us that Singapore is perhaps unusual in having experienced rapid economic
growth, and having been able to closely control population growth as a city-state.
Nonetheless, the Singapore model in which land value increases are socialized and
ownership is retained by the state might represent an interesting alternative way of
meeting the housing challenges of both poorer and wealthier cities.
More generally, the Singapore example reminds us that housing developments
are increasingly less easy to characterize as “state” or “market”, and many actual
cases entail a complex mix of state, markets and self-provisioning in providing
shelter for urban dwellers. In reform-era China, public housing was sold cheaply to
tenants, so that from a situation in 1981 where more than 80 % of the population
lived in state owned housing, often located in close proximity to their workplace, by
2010 more than 80 % of the urban population owned their own homes. As house
prices have risen dramatically in large cities, new migrants, poorer residents and
young people who never benefited from the earlier sale of public housing find it
increasingly difficult to find accommodation. Affordability issues undermined the
capacity of this market-dominated housing strategy to provide for urban residents
and by 2008 a state-led programme for delivering a mix of social, rental, affordable
(subsidized) and market housing in mass housing developments was initiated.
Another solution to housing need comes from urban dwellers themselves, where
they have self-organized to locate land, source materials and provide the labour to
build their own shelter. This can be a precarious option, with people settling in areas
of the city which might be subject to flooding or landslides, far from the centre of
Fig. 4.2 Housing development board properties in Singapore (Bukit Batok New Town, built c.
1985). Source http://www.teoalida.com/world/singapore/
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town, or which residents don’t have the legal right to occupy. However, land
invasions, or occupations are sometimes well-organized affairs, and can involve
powerful actors, such as politicians, political parties, or a range of collective,
informal or illegal organizations. These different groups might be involved in
finding land, arranging for plots to be made available, sometimes planning the
spatial arrangements of houses and communal facilities, and taking payment for
land transfers and rent. Large areas of cities have emerged through these processes,
for example Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl in Mexico City, where over a million people
now live, and where increasingly formal retail and industrial activities and even a
university are being developed (Fig. 4.3).
In fact “informal” or popular housing is seldom disorganized, but usually
involves a mix of both state and popular actors as well as legal and illegal actions.
In South American cities, where state provision of housing has been minimal over
many decades, securing services and entitlements to land have been a major focus
of citizens’ movements; and there is now a long tradition of slowly improving the
quality of housing and services on peripheral land acquired relatively cheaply by
poorer residents. Residents themselves incrementally extend their shelters and
improve the quality of materials, and the state finally brings in services and
transport connections, often after extensive political mobilization by residents.
Medellin in Colombia, for example, has become very famous for the cable cars
which have been developed to connect the central city areas to such informal areas
or barrios which have been located in steep, poorly located areas of town (Fig. 4.4).
Fig. 4.3 Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl in Mexico City. Source courtesy of Sonia Madrigal, http://
soniamadrigal.com
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Government involvement in the expansion and consolidation of informal
housing can be significant. In some situations, tacit or even quite explicit support
from governments can see the large-scale development of informal housing as a
way to solve problems of very rapid urbanization. In Istanbul, as new migrants from
the countryside arrived through the 1980s, the Islamic parties in the city fostered
informal settlements known as gecekondus, which both met housing needs and
provided a base for building a political base amongst the more religious new
immigrants. Perhaps the most famous example of this phenomenon is to be found in
China, where “urban villages” have made a major contribution to housing the
massive flows of new migrants to these cities (See Box 4.1 above). Former villagers
now own and manage often very dense, high-rise housing developments in and
close to major cities. While these have a de facto acceptance by the authorities, they
are very vulnerable to redevelopment pressures from diverse state and municipal
agencies. In Istanbul, too, the huge opportunities for profiting from alternative land
uses for informal areas have more recently seen major urban renewal initiatives by
the state, removing gecekondu residents (and increasingly residents of older, more
run-down and lower rise areas of the city) to very distant new housing estates
where, following the Chilean model, mortgages are made available to very poor
households to acquire tiny apartments. These strategies have freed up large areas of
land for controversial and profitable developments in central areas, which have been
linked to corruption in the government. In theory this releases some profits for
cross-subsidization of housing for the poor, but the housing remains largely
unaffordable, and, being removed to the outskirts of the city, has had devastating
Fig. 4.4 Medellin cable cars. Source courtesy of Julio Davila, https://www.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk/dpu/
metrocables/media-gallery
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consequences as people can no longer access employment opportunities; supportive
family and neighbourhood relationships have also been severed.
A widely discussed policy idea suggests that residents in informal settlements
should receive secure property rights. This would help them to feel confident about
their future, encouraging investment and upgrading of structures, and see them able
to use their investment in housing to support other goals, perhaps accessing
financing to set up their own businesses. These ideas, made popular by Hernando de
Soto from Peru in his book, The Mystery of Capital, have encountered some
practical difficulties in places where state capacity is limited. It can be easier for
better educated and wealthier people to organize to register their property rights, for
example, and sometimes powerful agents might usurp the entitlements of the poor.
Also this approach runs the risk of exposing poor people to subsequent pressures to
sell their property for redevelopment. In Brazil, special legislation has been passed
to protect poor communities by preventing the consolidation of small plots into
larger holdings, which would make them attractive to developers and wealthier
residents.
Policy ideas and practices in relation to informal housing have also emerged
from the residents of these areas themselves. The important international movement
originating in Mumbai, the Slum and Shack Dwellers International, has developed a
programme of transnational exchange involving sharing their bottom-up model of
self-enumeration and self-organization by slum residents to counter removal threats.
The movement has spread to many cities across Asia and Africa (see Box 4.3).
They also encourage residents to build their own plans for redevelopment and to
work with authorities to create financial arrangements for housing developments
which enable access to housing for the very poor. They have become involved in an
initiative from the United Nations and the World Bank, the Cities Alliance, one of
whose major ambitions is to see the elimination of “slums”, and who encourage and
support slum upgrading initiatives.
Box 4.3 Shack and Slum Dwellers International (SDI)
Background to the SDI: In 1974, shack dwellers in Mumbai who had resisted
eviction from their neighbourhood through collecting information about
themselves to negotiate more effectively with the authorities formed the basis
for a National Slum Dwellers Federation of India. As some key figures in the
movement note, explaining that there is only one toilet seat per 800 residents
in the slum of Dharavi in Mumbai had a much stronger impact when nego-
tiating with government than more general demands for rights. Very often
governments have no records of informal settlements, and no idea how many
people live there or the conditions of these areas. This initial group subse-
quently linked with pavement dwellers groups in the 1980s, and a growing
number of women’s savings groups, to form a wide network working with
similar enumeration methods, the Indian Alliance. Building alliances at the
city scale helped poor residents gain a stronger voice to develop and
50 4 Housing
implement solutions. By the 1990s, this model expanded further as the groups
began to hold international exchanges to share this model for developing the
voice of the poor in urban planning. The Shack/Slum Dwellers International
was formally set up by eight national federations in 1996, and many other
federations have since joined. A strategic association with the Cities Alliance
and the wider dissemination of the SDI method has seen a growing inter-
national use of this model of community self-enumeration and involvement in
urban development.
For details see Sheela Patel, Carrie Baptist and Celine D’Cruz, 2012,
“Knowledge is power—informal communities assert their right to the city
through SDI and community-led enumerations” Environment and
Urbanization, 24, 13–26).
Also there is a talk by Sheela Patel, one of the organizers of the SDI) at
http://unhabitat.org/the-federation-model-of-community-organizing-sheela-
patel-slum-dwellers-international/.
4.4 The Future Politics of Shelter
In many of the examples we have discussed here, from Singapore to Chile and
Istanbul, it is clear that the ability to realize profits from developing urban land
plays an increasingly important role in housing. On the one hand, in order to realize
very large scale housing developments governments will usually rely on major
developers. Issues concerning the impacts of land costs on profitability and
affordability drive such developments to more distant locations and often the
investments in infrastructure, transport and services necessary for ensuring inclu-
sive participation in the city are not delivered. High transport costs and inconve-
nient location mean that even subsidized developments can end up benefitting the
middle classes (who can afford the transport costs) rather than the poor (who can’t
afford to be so far from opportunities to make a living). More generally investment
in urban property, often involving very large-scale developments in and around
major cities, has come to be a significant contributor to economic growth and to the
profitability of capitalist enterprises globally. In this context, meeting housing need
competes with other profitable uses of land, and delivering housing for the poor
often relies on generating profits from the sale and use of land—whether this is
owned by the state (in China and Singapore, for example), or planned by the state
for private sector speculation (as in Europe and the US).
Certainly, the sometimes inventive mix of agents and processes involved in
delivering housing, including the impressive agency of urban dwellers themselves,
holds out some promise in the search for shelter solutions for cities of the future.
The potential to upgrade and improve well-located informally developed housing at
a modest cost is recognized by many housing analysts as an essential part of
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meeting future housing needs. But it is also the case that the mix of state ambition
and the search for profits by global investors presents some threats both to these
settlements and to our collective urban futures.
A major danger is that many urban residents around the world face removal and
upheaval from environments where closely interwoven opportunities for liveli-
hoods, shelter and social relationships have been forged over many years. Whether
this entails the displacement of residents from social housing in Europe, the
redevelopment of slums in India, or the formal incorporation and redevelopment of
Chinese urban villages, the future of the many hundreds of millions of urban
dwellers for whom shelter is a daily challenge in terms of availability, affordability,
and healthy living looks precarious and will be determined through various com-
binations of ambitious state strategies, the widespread global shift of capital
investment into urban property development, and the actions of often unpredictable
institutions caught up in local power relationships.
This is as much a concern in the rapidly growing cities of middle-income
countries as it is in economically prominent “global” cities like London. The scale,
profitability and security of property investments in the wealthiest cities attracts the
attention of global corporate capital and encourages ambitious infrastructure
development by the state to support this. In London, for example, this means that
poorer households, squeezed in terms of incomes by the changing form of work
under corporate globalization, are being displaced from the central city and even
relatively well-paid middle class residents are priced out of accommodation;
widespread child poverty is being entrenched as a result of increasing housing costs
and the loss of social housing to regeneration. In middle- and low-income cities
ambitious developments, often on the outskirts of cities, can detract from the
capacity to invest in the basic infrastructure provision desperately needed in
existing parts of the city. Moreover, in stimulating further urban sprawl, environ-
mentally unsustainable outcomes pose a threat to the future of the planet. Given the
anticipated growth of the world’s urban population over the next decades, with as
many as 2.5 billion people predicted to be added to cities from 2010 to 2050, the
future of providing shelter in cities presents one of the most significant challenges
for humanity. This draws us then to the concluding chapter where we reflect more
broadly on the future of urbanization.
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Additional data sources
www.web.worldbank.org (“Urban Poverty and Slum Upgrading”) brings together data and prac-
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In this short book we have presented an overview of some of the most urgent issues
and questions facing city dwellers, planners and scholars about the development
and social significance of cities. We have examined how cities first appeared and
evolved through historical time; we have considered the basic logic of cities in
terms of work and livelihood, employment and production; and we have looked
intently at the phenomena of housing, shelter, and residential development and their
effects on urban life. Clearly, from all that has gone before, cities are extraordinarily
complex and problematical places that generate a continually shifting groundwork
of predicaments and opportunities. What, we might ask, are the prospects for cities
in the 21st century, and what future changes are likely to come into view?
The great urban utopian schemes that were proposed in the 19th and 20th
centuries may seem to be a thing of the past. Numerous individuals, from Robert
Owen in early 19th century Britain to Le Corbusier in mid-20th century France, set
out plans for the reform of human society by means of ambitious projects intended
to sweep away the debris of previous rounds of urbanization and to rebuild cities
that they thought would put humanity on a new and higher plane of existence.
While this kind of social utopianism is highly unfashionable today, perhaps because
of its conspicuous failure ever to deliver on its various promises, ambitious plans
for the reform of 21st century cities abound.
Some of these are developmental—like the Cities Alliance ambition for “cities
without slums.” In the light of what has been said in Chaps. 3 and 4 there are
numerous unfinished tasks of economic development and social integration in
contemporary cities, and these often vary widely depending on which parts of the
world may be under consideration. It is in poorer countries, however, that these
tasks are most urgently in need of attention. This is perhaps nowhere more the case
than in many African countries where histories of colonial exploitation have
combined with post-colonial political turmoil and often severe economic challenges
to jeopardize their ability to cope with very high rates of urbanization. The
developmental challenges of the urban future are significant—and have been rec-
ognized by the international agreement through the United Nations to set specific
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targets for Sustainable Urban Development to promote the rights of all urban
dwellers to safe, inclusive and sustainable urban futures.
Many ambitious projects about urban futures are concerned with the environ-
ment. Although we have not explored this issue in this publication, cities all over
the world today play a major role in engendering and exacerbating the contem-
porary environmental crisis. This role is manifest in the different ways in which
they are sources of atmospheric, ground, and water pollution. The rising tide of
urban population growth, increasing levels of disposable income, and uncontrolled
sprawl mean that these problems are unlikely to disappear in the foreseeable future.
Many commentators, though, are hopeful that the dynamism and innovative nature
of urban centres might generate solutions. For example, increasing density of urban
living potentially mitigates the environmental impact of a growing world popula-
tion. Also, many municipalities, through networks and idea sharing with cities
across the world, are making strenuous efforts to introduce effective environmental
regulations. While cities are deeply implicated in processes of global warming, and
the ever-increasing emission of carbon gases due to intensifying urban transport,
economic activity, and domestic heating, lighting, and air-conditioning demands is
having dramatically deleterious effects on the atmosphere, the potential to organize
cities differently, with more public transport and green buildings, holds out hope for
a better urban future.
The tension in this urban environmental agenda concerns the extent to which it
might be co-opted by large corporations and wealthier urban residents to advance
their own interests. The concept of eco-cities, for example, and wider ideas about
sustainable or green urban design, have become part of the vigorous circulation of
international planning norms around the globe by large western multinational
architectural and engineering firms, as well as by successful Asian companies and
state development agencies. As a result, it is not clear yet to what extent eco-cities
will provide opportunities for socio-technical innovation in the search for more
environmentally and socially inclusive forms of urban living, or whether they will
form a basis for the further displacement and exclusion of the poor through
so-called eco-friendly developments.
Ambitious plans for the future of cities also involve the intricate digital and
infrastructural technologies that are now emerging under the banner of the “smart
city”, and which involve collecting and coordinating information, and building
intelligent management systems. These technologies could also play a critical role
in helping to address environmental concerns, especially given their enormous
potential in regard to the coordination and delivery of public services, traffic con-
trol, and pollution monitoring. Under conditions of corporate globalization, the key
question again is to what degree these technologies will be deployed in the pursuit
of profit rather than meeting the demands of social equity. The question is espe-
cially urgent as much of the futuristic thinking here is bound up with the work of
large corporations who spread these ideas through their marketing and sale of
technology and the software they have developed. However, local political
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concerns can block and slow down the implementation of even very ambitious
models—the Indian Government’s goal to build 100 new smart cities to accom-
modate the anticipated urbanization of the next decades faces challenges not only of
governance capacity, but also of locally based democratic opposition. The oppor-
tunities for digital networking amongst urban residents could support wider eco-
nomic and social goals and might equally play a role in shaping future urban
developments.
As the shifting character of globalization proceeds, an expanding worldwide
network of major metropolitan areas or city-regions has made its decisive historical
and geographical appearance. Representative examples are New York, Los
Angeles, Paris, Amsterdam, Buenos Aires, São Paulo, Mexico City, Dakar,
Johannesburg, Mumbai, Bangkok, Beijing, and Tokyo, but these are only a few of
the literally hundreds of large city-regions that now exist throughout the modern
world (see Table 2.3). City-regions constitute to an ever-increasing degree the basic
engines of the global economy, for they generate collectively by far the dominant
share of the economic output of modern capitalism. As such, they are converging in
functional terms into an integrated planetary system as they become increasingly
locked into mutual relationships of collaboration, trade, and population movement.
The likelihood is that these city-regions will continue to grow in size and number,
especially in much of the Global South.
Thus, China’s urban population more than doubled over the period from 1990 to
2005, and is predicted to reach 1 billion soon after 2025. This has required the vast
expansion of existing cities, and the emergence of new cities, such as Shenzhen,
near Hong Kong. Shenzhen was a village of 10,000 in 1980 but is now one of the
world’s largest cities at over 10 million and is part of a much larger sprawling area
of industry-led urbanization. Cities built as part of this vast urban expansion have
become models for future urban development across Asia and elsewhere. The large
finance, construction and development firms which build expertise in such devel-
opments find opportunities for similar large scale construction in many other cities,
from Kigali (Rwanda) to Phnom Penh (Cambodia), eager to model themselves on
the Asian success stories of Singapore, Seoul and Shanghai. Even in some of the
poorest cities of the world, then, plans are underway to develop large-scale new
satellite cities. At the right price housing in these developments is finding pur-
chasers amongst the middle classes who seek better living conditions. An inter-
esting art intervention (see Fig. 5.1) from the Kinshasa-based sculptor Bodys Isek
Kingelez, reminds us that modernist dreams of replacing run-down and
problem-ridden cities with a new, vertical, exciting urbanism can incite interest
even as they might also constitute problematical fantasies which can easily lead to
serious over-reach and socially regressive public spending.
Certainly, one of the deepest challenges of some of the more ambitious concepts
about urban futures concerns who benefits from them. In particular, what aspects of
city life are to be organized under the rules of private property and what aspects are
to be elements of a more communal form of existence? A major question con-
cerning both the present and the future revolves around the status of the city as a
place of public benefits. In capitalism, with the privileged role that it ascribes to
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individual behavior, competition, and markets, the city has frequently been seen by
both social scientists and ordinary citizens as essentially a site of anomie, detach-
ment, individualism, and antagonism. This way of seeing things, however, over-
looks one of the primary features of the urbanization process, namely, that it is a
collective outcome that is very much greater than the sum of the parts. This state of
affairs leads on to the further insight that huge swaths of urban life are dependent on
what the Nobel prize winner Elinor Ostrom has called “common pool resources,”
that is, assets that are held either by all or by designated groups of people. In the
city, these assets take on a multitude of forms, ranging from the agglomeration
economies that are one of the foundations of urban growth, through the public
goods and services that are essential for the smooth operation of the city and the
pursuit of urban social life, to the cultural and intellectual assets that every city
accumulates in its traditions and institutions. The advantages and disadvantages of
cities for social and economic life are in large degree the result of these many
different resources. In other words, we must add to the Durkheimian notion of
organic solidarity that is built into the intra-urban division of labor, the forms of
solidarity that also come from the shared economic, social, and cultural resources
that make up the urban commons. This state of affairs gives new urgency and
meaning to the old refrain that we all have a right to the city.
Over the next few decades the expected growth across the planet in numbers of
urban dwellers (in cities of all sizes from large city-regions to small towns) will be
of the order of about 80 million people a year. The United Nations predicts that
Fig. 5.1 Bodys Isek Kingelez: “Project for Kinshasa for the Third Millenium, 1997.” Source
https://en.louisiana.dk/exhibition/africa
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nearly one billion new urban dwellers will be added in Africa from 2010 to 2050,
and around 1.5 billion in Asia over the same time period. This continued growth
will assuredly augment the range and intensity of urban problems in the future.
While corporate globalization has certainly stamped its mark on cities across the
world, and will no doubt continue to do so, we can also expect that residents in
cities everywhere will seek to forge their own ways of living and reproducing
themselves, their families and wider communities, which means, too, contesting the
agendas of both global economic actors and ambitious or predatory states. In
addition, urban futures will be partly shaped by the social networks which city
dwellers everywhere forge, as well as by the formulation of imaginative future
possibilities. The urban anthropologist Filip de Boeck writing of Kinshasa, one of
the world’s most informalized cities, quotes the local writer, Vincent Lombume
Kalimasi, to the effect that despite all the challenges people who live there face
“The city is a never-ending construction. The city can never remain a passive
victim. The city is, on the contrary, a place of possibility, the place that enables you
to do and to act.”
All of this indicates that the most socially and politically viable kinds of urban
outcomes typically reflect inclusive, collective planning and coordination, respon-
sive to the solutions urban dwellers find for themselves, and not just arbitrary
impositions by ambitious bureaucrats, or the products of profit-seeking developers.
Collective action is an essential component of an urban order which meets the needs
of all residents. It is essential for ensuring the availability and continuity of the
public resources of the city as well as for resolving the many conflicts, breakdowns
and failures that are also always an intrinsic element of urbanization processes. In
the present deepening climate of neoliberalism, even currently existing collective
arrangements of association, planning and coordination are politically under threat
from those who consider that the market is the most effective way of preserving the
urban commons and dealing with urban challenges. Even so, rebuilding capacities
for collective and state action in some of the poorest cities is recognized interna-
tionally as a priority for the 21st century. We feel that the imperative of collective
action in urban affairs is all the more important given the need to deal with the
alarmingly deepening divide in incomes and life chances that is present in cities in
all parts of the world. These remarks suggest that above and beyond the right to the
city we must also take seriously the normative idea of the right to make the city.
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